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Intraday trading targets play an important role in the dynamics of liquidity provision
and demand over the trading day in financial markets. For example, intraday liquidity
providers usually target a neutral (e.g., zero) inventory level.1 In addition, trade execution
by large institutional investors is widely benchmarked relative to a time-weighted average
price (TWAP) or volume-weighted average price (VWAP) reference price. Compensation
schemes tied to such benchmarks can lead to intraday target trajectories to trade a constant
amount per unit time (TWAP) or an amount indexed to track the daily volume curve
(VWAP). Deviations from the intraday target trajectories are then penalized. As a result,
investors care, not only about their terminal trading target, but also about the intraday
trajectory of their trading relative to a TWAP or VWAP benchmark trajectory. However,
traders sometimes intentionally deviate from their trajectories in order to achieve trading
profits (such as by market makers) and price improvement (such as by large institutions).
We call optimized trading strategies that trade off trading profits and target-deviation
penalties smart TWAP or smart VWAP strategies.2
Our paper is the first to model the equilibrium impact of TWAP and VWAP bench-
marking on intraday trading and market liquidity. We view intraday inventory and trading
target trajectories and penalties as solutions to agency and risk-management problems be-
tween brokers and portfolio managers (for institutions) and between trading desks and
brokerage owners (for market makers).3 We take intraday trading target trajectories and
penalties as inputs to our model, and then show how smart TWAP and VWAP trading
strategies affect price dynamics and liquidity over the trading day. In particular, we model
a market with multiple strategic investors with different trading targets who follow optimal
continuous-time dynamic trading strategies. Our paper solves for equilibria in closed-form.
Our TWAP results are as follows:
• An infinite number of equilibria exist with each equilibrium pinned down by a con-
tinuous function giving the price impact of strategic investors’ individual orders.
• Intraday TWAP strategies reduce intraday market liquidity and increase price volatil-
ity relative to a market in which investors just have terminal end-of-day trading tar-
1Hagstro¨mer and Norde´n (2013) and Menkveld (2013) show that high-frequency (HFT) market makers
are an important source of intraday liquidity. A common feature of HFT market makers is that they have
“very short time-frames for establishing and liquidating positions” (SEC 2010), which is consistent with a
zero target inventory level. Weller (2018) shows further that liquidity over the trading day is provided by
an ecosystem of liquidity providers with slower and faster trading latencies who shift inventory between
themselves over holding periods of different lengths. This behavior is also consistent with zero intraday
inventory targets.
2Madhavan (2002) discusses price improvement on order execution relative to VWAP. Domowitz and
Yegerman (2005) estimate empirical execution costs benchmarked relative to VWAP.
3Baldauf, Frei, and Mollner (2018) show that compensating schemes based on VWAP are optimal in
certain principal-agent problems related to optimal portfolio delegation.
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gets. This is because penalties for intraday deviations from TWAP trajectories reduce
the inventory-holding willingness of investors during the day.
• Our model predicts price volatility and market illiquidity are greater on days with
stronger TWAP penalties. In addition, our model makes empirical predictions about
intraday patterns in prices and liquidity: First, liquidity effects due to positive im-
balances in terminal TWAP trading targets produce intraday predictable trends in
which prices fall on average. Second, the intraday pattern of the volatility of cumu-
lative intraday liquidity effects in prices is hump-shaped conditional on the opening
price.
• The welfare-maximizing equilibrium can differ from the competitive equilibrium. For
example, investors can have different target deviations depending on their private trad-
ing targets in the welfare-maximizing equilibrium, whereas investors all have identical
target deviations in the competitive equilibrium.
Our discussion focuses on preferences that are linear in investor terminal wealth and a
TWAP penalty. In addition, we provide two extensions: First, we extend our TWAP model
to stochastic VWAP target trajectories. Second, we extend the analysis to exponential
preferences.4
Dynamic order execution strategies are pervasive in financial markets. O’Hara (2015)
describes dynamic order execution both by investors with asymmetric information as well
as by pensions, index funds, and other passive investors rebalancing their portfolios. The
practice of benchmarking order-execution quality with VWAP and other metrics is described
in Berkowitz, Logue, and Noser (1988) and Madhavan (2002).5 In contrast to the optimal
control literature surveyed in Gatheral and Shied (2013), we model dynamic trading with
benchmarking in an equilibrium framework. For an empirical perspective on the extent
of order-execution benchmarking in practice, the trading survey Financial Insights (2006)
reports that VWAP execution orders represent around 50% of all institutional trading.
Our model is most closely related to previous research by Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2005) and Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan (2007) on optimal rebalancing and predatory
4The market in our model is incomplete in that there is only one stock but two Brownian motions
driving its price. Existence of continuous-time Radner equilibria with exponential utilities in an incomplete
competitive market has been proved in various levels of generality in Christensen, Larsen, and Munk (2012),
Zˇitkovic´ (2012), Christensen and Larsen (2014), Choi and Larsen (2015), Larsen and Sae-Sue (2016), Xing
and Zˇitkovic´ (2018), and Weston (2018). To the best of our knowledge, there is no extension of these
models to an incomplete market equilibrium with continuous trading and price impact (Vayanos (1999)
proves existence in a discrete-time model). Appendix C presents such a continuous-time extension in which
investors with exponential utilities have TWAP targets.
5In contrast to TWAP and VWAP, implementation shortfall, an alternative benchmark (Perold 1988),
does not control for intraday price trends and thus does not lead to an intraday target trading trajectory.
2
trading. There are three main differences: First, our strategic agents are subject to penalties
tied to intraday target trading trajectories rather than just a single terminal penalty at the
end of the day. Second, there are no ad hoc intraday liquidity providers in our model.
Instead, all intraday liquidity is provided endogenously by rational strategic agents. As
a result, there is no predatory trading in our model.6 Third, the active agent’s trading
target is publicly known in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), whereas trading targets are
initially private knowledge in our model. Information about trading targets is then partially
revealed through the trading process. Our paper also builds on the Vayanos (1999) model
of dynamic strategic trading. That model also has multiple equilibria like ours. However,
investors in Vayanos (1999) smooth a series of random personal endowment shocks, whereas
our strategic investors have heterogeneous trading target trajectories they would like to
reach over the day. In addition, our intraday setting lets us ignore endogenous consumption
decisions. The discrete-time model in Du and Zhu (2017) also has quadratic penalties but
with zero targets and has private dividend information (whereas dividend information is
public in our model) as well as endowment shocks.
Our model is also related to Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2016) and the multi-agent extension
in Bouchard, Fukasawa, Herdegen, and Muhle-Karbe (2018). In these fully competitive
equilibrium models, traders incur penalties based on their stock holdings as well as their
trading rates. Our model differs because we allow for price-impact of individual trades, and
we allow for non-zero trading targets that are private information. Furthermore, because
our traders are penalized based on deviations from intraday targets and not on their rates of
trade, our optimal stock holdings (i.e., inventories) are not given in terms of trading rates.
This property allows our investors to absorb noise trades with only finite second variation
such as the Brownian motion dynamics in, e.g., Kyle (1985).
Lastly, there is no asymmetric information about future asset cash-flow fundamentals
in our model. Thus, the analysis here on trading and the non-informational component
of market liquidity is complimentary to Choi, Larsen, and Seppi (2018), which studies
order-splitting and dynamic rebalancing in a Kyle (1985) style market in which a strategic
informed investor with long-lived private information and a strategic rebalancer with a hard
terminal trading target both follow dynamic trading strategies. Instead, our model extends
the microstructure literature on inventory costs in market making that began with Garman
(1976) and Stoll (1978). In addition, trading constraints here are soft rather than hard.
6In Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), ad hoc liquidity providers trade using an exogenous linear schedule
that does not rationally anticipate predictable future price changes later in the day given earlier trading.
3
1 Model
We develop a continuous-time equilibrium model with a unit horizon in which trade takes
place at each time point t ∈ [0, 1]. This can be interpreted as one trading day. Our
model has two securities: a money market account with a constant unit price (i.e., the
account pays a zero interest rate) and a stock with an endogenously determined price process
S = (St)t∈[0,1]. The stock pays random dividends generated by a publicly observable and
exogenous standard Brownian motion state-process D = (Dt)t∈[0,1] with a given constant
fixed initial value D0 ∈ R, zero drift, and volatility normalized to one. We model Dt as
the expectation at time t < 1 of future dividends, where D1 is either a liquidating dividend
paid at time t = 1 or simply the time t = 1 expectation of all future dividends.
Two types of investors trade in our model:
• There are M ∈ N strategic investors who trade over the day to minimize penalties
relative to intraday trading targets and to exploit profitable trading opportunities.
For a generic investor i, let a˜i denote the investor’s terminal end-of-day target stock
holdings, and let θi,t denote the investor’s actual stock holdings at a generic time t.
Let θi,− and θ
(0)
i,− denote the investor’s initial stock holdings and initial money market
balances. Thus, a˜i − θi,− is the total amount of stock investor i ideally wants to
have traded by the end of the day, and θi,t − θi,− is the cumulative amount investor
i has actually traded by time t. The difference a˜i − θi,− can be viewed as a so-
called parent order, and the difference θi,t − θi,− is the cumulative total executed via
a sequence of so-called child orders up through time t. The initial money-market
balances (θ
(0)
1,−, ..., θ
(0)
M,−), initial stock holdings (θ1,−, ..., θM,−), and terminal stock-
holding targets (a˜1, ..., a˜M ) are private knowledge of the M investors.
7 At this point,
we make no distributional assumptions about these variables except for them being
independent of D.
An important feature of our model is that strategic investors have a target trajectory
for trading defined over the whole day and that they incur inventory penalties tied
to intraday deviations between their actual cumulative stock trading at each point in
time and their target trajectory over time. In other words, investors care not only
about their target a˜i at the end of the day, but also about how quickly their parent
order is executed over the trading day. The intraday target TWAP trajectory for
investor i is a function defined over the trading day that gives for each time t ∈ [0, 1]
the portion of the total daily trading target that investor i would ideally like to have
completed by time t.8 In particular, the target trading trajectory at a generic time
7An investor’s stock holding is often referred to as inventory.
8See Chapter 5 in Johnson (2010) for more about TWAP trading.
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t is γ(t)(a˜i − θi,−) where γ(t) is a nonnegative continuous function for t ∈ [0, 1].
A simple TWAP target has γ(t) := t. For generalized TWAP targets with time-
varying weights, the γ(t) function is non-decreasing and converges to 1 as t ↑ 1. For
example, γ(t) might follow the shape of the average cumulative volume curve over the
trading day. A TWAP target trajectory for cumulative trading can also be expressed
equivalently in terms of a trajectory γ(t)(a˜i − θi,−) + θi,− for the stock holdings of
investor i at time t. The TWAP assumption that the target ratio γ(t) is deterministic
simplifies our analysis. Section 7 extends the model to allow for stochastically varying
targets related to VWAP.
The penalty process for investor i ∈ {1, ...,M} is9
Li,t :=
∫ t
0
κ(s)
(
γ(s)(a˜i − θi,−)− (θi,s − θi,−)
)2
ds, t ∈ [0, 1]. (1.1)
The severity of the penalty is controlled by κ(t), which is a deterministic strictly posi-
tive function. Intuitively, the penalty severity for deviations from the target trajectory
is likely to be increasing over the trading day. Our results below allow for penalty-
severity functions κ(t) that explode towards the end of the trading day as t ↑ 1 as well
as for bounded penalty severities. To keep the model as simple as possible, we assume
all strategic investors are subject to the same deterministic functions γ(t) and κ(t).
Section 6 considers several specific numerical examples. We differentiate between two
types of investors based on their realized trading targets a˜i. We refer to investors
with targets a˜i 6= θi,− as institutional investors. Traders with a˜i = θi,− do not need
to trade but can provide liquidity. We call these traders market makers or intraday
strategic liquidity providers. Thus, institutional investors and market makers differ in
the target amount they want to trade but face the same penalties for diverging from
their trading target.
• There are noise traders whose trading motives are exogenous. Let wt denote the
stock’s fixed shares outstanding minus the aggregate noise-trader holdings. Thus, wt
denotes the stock supply that the strategic investors must absorb at time t ∈ [0, 1].
9Quadratic penalization schemes constitute a cornerstone in research related to mean-variance analysis
dating back to Markowitz (1952). The penalty (1.1) penalizes holdings θi,t (i.e., trader i’s inventory) and
not buying/selling rates. Rates are penalized in Almgren and Chriss (1999, 2000), Almgren (2003), Gatheral
and Schied (2011), Almgren (2012), Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2016), and Bouchard et al. (2018) and forces
the optimal stock holdings to be given in terms of rates. Optimal buying/selling rates also exist in the
continuous-time model in Kyle (1985) as well as in its non-Gaussian extension in Back (1992). Predoiu et al.
(2011) consider a model where the optimal holding process is of finite variation but includes discrete orders
which implies that no optimal rate exists. In contrast, optimal holding processes in our model have infinite
first variation (and only finite second variation), and no optimal rates can exist. This property allows our
strategic investors to absorb the noise-trader orders from (1.3) below, which would be impossible in models
where optimal holdings are given in terms of rates.
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We assume wt is supplied inelastically by the noise traders. Consequently, the stock
market clears at time t ∈ [0, 1] when the strategic investors’ holdings (θi)Mi=1 satisfy
wt =
M∑
i=1
θi,t. (1.2)
We assume that the stock supply has dynamics (Gaussian Ornstein-Uhlenbeck)
dwt := (α− piwt)dt+ ηdBt, w0 ∈ R. (1.3)
Gaussian noise traders have been widely used; see, e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)
and Kyle (1985). In (1.3), the parameters α, pi, and η are constants, and B is another
standard Brownian motion that is independent of the dividend Brownian motion D
and of the strategic investors’ targets and initial holdings. The specification (1.3)
includes cumulative noise-trader supply that follow an arithmetic Brownian motion
(pi = 0) with a possible predictable trend (α) as well as possibly mean-reverting
dynamics (pi > 0) or positively autocorrelated changes (pi < 0).
To pin down the stock price at the end of the trading day, we require that
S1 = D1 + ϕ0a˜Σ + ϕ1w1 (1.4)
where ϕ0, ϕ1 ∈ R and where the total net target imbalance for all M strategic investors is
denoted by10
a˜Σ :=
M∑
i=1
a˜i. (1.5)
In other words, the terminal stock price is the end-of-day dividend factor D1 adjusted up
or down depending on the aggregate target of the strategic investors (where ϕ0 > 0 means
a positive aggregate target imbalance a˜Σ raises prices) and on the end-of-day noise-trader
supply (where ϕ1 < 0 means a positive inelastic noise-trader supply w1 lowers prices).
11
There are several possible interpretations for this reduced-form. One is for a special case of
(1.4) in which D1 is a liquidating dividend at time t = 1 (as in, e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz
10We call a˜Σ the target imbalance because a˜Σ is the positive buying targets less the negative selling targets.
11If the terminal restriction (1.4) is eliminated, our model becomes simpler because the stock’s volatility
becomes a free parameter and can, for example, be set to be one. The fact that competitive (Radner)
equilibrium models without dividends have free volatilities is well-known; see, e.g., Theorem 4.6.3 in Karatzas
and Shreve (1998).
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(1980)). In this case, (1.4) becomes
S1 = D1. (1.6)
It is clear that for St to converge as in (1.4) or (1.6), the price dynamics are restricted as
time approaches maturity (i.e., as t ↑ 1). We return to this issue in Remark 2.1.1 below.
When our model is applied to a short time horizon (e.g., a trading day), the end-of-day stock
valuation is not the value of an immediate terminal dividend D1, but rather the overnight
valuation attached to future dividends. We offer two overnight interpretations. One is
that (1.4) is the market-clearing valuation at which the M strategic investors are willing to
hold w1 shares over night. An alternate interpretation is that there is a separate group of
overnight liquidity providers who arrive and trade in an additional wrap-up round of trading
right after time t = 1.12 In this alternative, (1.4) is a reduced-form for the market-clearing
valuation given the overnight liquidity provider demand plus any overnight demand from
the M strategic investors.13 For any of these three interpretations of (1.4), our model then
produces intraday equilibrium prices and trading dynamics given the TWAP preferences
and the terminal (overnight) stock valuation condition.
The information structure of our model is as follows: For tractability, we assume the
strategic investors have homogeneous beliefs. They all believe the processes (D,B) are
the same independent Brownian motions. Over time, the realized dividend factor Dt and
the noise-trader orders wt are publicly observed.
14 At time t ∈ [0, 1], investor i chooses a
cumulative stock-holding position θi,t that satisfies the measurability requirement
15
θi,t ∈ Fi,t := σ(a˜i, θi,−, θ(0)i,−, a˜Σ, Bu, Du)u∈[0,t]. (1.7)
It might seem unclear why a˜Σ is included in investor i’s information set. One possibility
is that a˜Σ may be directly observable in the market. However, public observability is not
12Our overnight liquidity providers are different from the ad hoc intraday residual liquidity providers who
trade continuously during the day as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005).
13A natural restriction in this interpretation is |ϕ0| < |ϕ1|. Noise traders trade inelastically, so the
full noise-trader order imbalance w1 must be held by the overnight liquidity-providers and the strategic
investors. In contrast, the strategic investors do not demand to achieve their aggregate ideal holdings a˜Σ
inelastically. Note that in the overnight-liquidity-provider interpretation markets at time 1 are just cleared
by the M strategic investors, whereas in the wrap-up round the market is cleared by both the overnight
liquidity providers and the M strategic investors together. However, if the price S1 at time 1 differs from
the valuation D1 + ϕ0a˜Σ + ϕ1w1 of the overnight liquidity providers, then a discrete jump between S1
to D1 + ϕ0a˜Σ + ϕ1w1 would be inconsistent with optimal continuous trading trajectories for the strategic
investors. Hence, we must have (1.4).
14 The noise-trader orders wt are either directly observed or are inferred from St and Dt.
15As usual in continuous-time models, we also need to impose an integrability condition to ensure that
certain stochastic integrals are martingale; see Definition 1.1 below.
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necessary. As we shall see in the next section, the equilibria we construct have
σ(a˜i, θi,−, θ
(0)
i,−, a˜Σ, Bu, Du)u∈[0,t] = σ(a˜i, θi,−, θ
(0)
i,−, Su, Du)u∈[0,t]. (1.8)
In other words, although investors only know their own target a˜i directly, they can infer
the aggregate net target a˜Σ in equilibrium from the initial stock price because
σ(S0) = σ(a˜Σ). (1.9)
See Remark 2.1.2 below for details. Thus, our model lets us investigate the effects of known
or inferable aggregate trading targets on intraday trading and pricing.16
Next, we turn to the strategic investors’ individual optimization problems. For a strategy
θi,t ∈ Fi,t, let Xi,t denote investor i’s wealth process, which has dynamics
dXi,t := θi,tdSt, Xi,0 := θi,−S0 + θ
(0)
i,−. (1.10)
As usual, integrating (1.10) gives the wealth process
Xi,t = Xi,0 +
∫ t
0
θi,udSu, t ∈ [0, 1]. (1.11)
The set of admissible strategies Ai for investor i is defined as follows:
Definition 1.1. A jointly measurable and Fi adapted process θi = (θi,t)t∈[0,1] is admissible,
and we write θi ∈ Ai, if the following integrability condition holds
E
[∫ 1
0
θ2i,tdt
∣∣∣Fi,0] <∞. (1.12)
♦
It is well-known that an integrability condition like (1.12) rules out doubling strategies
(see, e.g., Chapters 5 and 6 in Duffie (2001) for a discussion of such conditions). While all
bounded processes θi,t satisfy the integrability condition (1.12), the optimal stock holding
process in (2.8) below is not bounded but does still satisfy (1.12).
For simplicity, we assume all strategic investors have linear utility functions: Ui(x) := x
for all i ∈ {1, ...,M}. For a given stock-price process S, investor i seeks an expected utility-
maximizing holding strategy θˆi ∈ Ai that attains
V (Xi,0, w0, a˜i, a˜Σ) := sup
θi∈Ai
E
[
Xi,1 − Li,1
∣∣∣Fi,0] . (1.13)
16In contrast, rebalancing shocks are ex ante common knowledge in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005).
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In (1.13), the variable Li,1 is the terminal penalty value from the penalty process in (1.1),
and the terminal wealth Xi,1 is from (1.11). Section 8 extends our analysis to homogeneous
exponential utilities Ui(x) := −e−x/τ , x ∈ R, for a common risk-tolerance parameter τ > 0.
In the objective (1.13), there are two competing drivers. On one hand, neglecting the
penalty term Li,1 in (1.13) gives investor i an incentive to use the optimal Merton strategy
(with price-impact). On the other hand, neglecting the wealth term Xi,1 in (1.13) implies
that investor i should follow the TWAP strategy γ(t)(a˜i − θi,−) + θi,−. The equilibrium
strategy θˆi,t in (2.8) below strikes an optimal balance between these two competing forces
where the penalty-severity function κ(t) determines the relative importance of these two
forces over the trading interval t ∈ [0, 1].
2 Equilibrium
We start by discussing the market-clearing conditions. First, the initial stock holdings
θ1,−, ..., θM,− (also private information variables) satisfy in aggregate
w0 =
M∑
i=1
θi,−. (2.1)
This means that the initial amount of the total outstanding shares not held by the noise
traders is held by the strategic investors. Furthermore, at all later times t ∈ (0, 1], the stock
holdings (θ1,t, ..., θM,t) must also satisfy the intraday clearing condition (1.2). The money
market is assumed to be in zero supply, and so, initially, we have
∑M
i=1 θ
(0)
i,− = 0. Clearing in
the stock market at later time points t ∈ (0, 1] spills over to clearing in the money market
because the strategic investors must use self-financing strategies.
Next, we turn to the stock-price dynamics. In the equilibria we construct, each investor
i ∈ {1, ...,M} perceives that they face a price process of the form
dSt := µi,tdt+ σw(t)ηdBt + dDt, (2.2)
where σw(t) is an endogenous price-impact loading and η is the noise-trader supply volatility
coefficient in (1.3). The drift in (2.2) is given by
µi,t := µ0(t)a˜Σ + µ1(t)θi,t + µ2(t)a˜i + µ3(t)wt + µ4(t)w0 + µ5(t)θi,−, (2.3)
and depends on public information variables (a˜Σ, wt, w0), private information variables
9
(a˜i, θi,t, θi,−) known to investor i, and a set of endogenous smooth deterministic functions
µ0, ..., µ5, σw : [0, 1]→ R. (2.4)
These price dynamics can be interpreted as follows: First, prices move one-to-one with
changes dDt in the dividend factor. Second, random shocks ηdBt to the noise-trader
supply move prices linearly as given by the deterministic function σw(t). Third, since
a˜Σ, θi,t, a˜i, wt, w0, and θi,− are known to investor i at time t, they are not sources of future
price randomness. Rather, they appear in the price drift as sources of predictable future
price movement. For example, for the strategic investors to be willing in aggregate to absorb
an inelastic positive noise-trader supply wt at time t ∈ [0, 1] given the TWAP penalties, we
expect them to require a higher expected return. Thus, we expect the coefficient µ3(t) on
wt in the price drift in (2.3) to be positive. Similarly, when the M strategic investors want
to buy a positive net trading target a˜Σ in aggregate, the expected price drift needs to be
depressed (i.e., µ0(t) < 0) to deter them from trying to buy for markets to clear.
We now discuss our equilibrium notion. In multi-agent models such as Foster and
Viswanathan (1996) and in Vayanos (1999), the price-impact function an investor faces
(i.e., how S depends on the investor’s holdings) is derived from a market-clearing condition
combined with a conjecture about how other investors’ holdings depend on S (i.e., the
demand curves for the other investors). In contrast, the drift in (2.3) is a reduced-form
relation describing how investor i perceives the impact of any position θi,t she might hold has
on prices. In particular, our price impact is expressed as a function of the underlying model
input variables. Implicit in (2.3) are deeper underlying perceptions for investor i about how
the demands of the other M − 1 investors would respond to different potential positions θi,t
taken by investor i and also even deeper game-theoretic beliefs that the other M−1 investors
might hold that would support such demand behavior on their part. However, we do not
explicitly micro-found these deeper perceptions and beliefs. That is beyond the scope of
this paper. Rather, we find restrictions on (2.3) such that markets clear and that investors
trade optimally given that (2.3) gives their perception of the price impact of their individual
positions θi,t and their other information. In particular, their in-equilibrium price beliefs
are consistent with the equilibrium price dynamics. In addition, Example 3.3 below shows
how investor demand-curve models are a special case of our price-impact model (2.2)-(2.3).
Definition 2.1 (Equilibrium). The deterministic functions (µ0, ..., µ5, σw) constitute a equi-
librium if, given the stock-price dynamics (2.2)-(2.3), the resulting optimal stock holding
processes (θˆi,t)
M
i=1 from (1.13) satisfy the following three conditions:
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(i) the market-clearing condition
wt =
M∑
i=1
θˆi,t (2.5)
holds at all times t ∈ [0, 1],
(ii) the terminal price condition (1.4) holds at time t = 1 for constants ϕ0, ϕ1 ∈ R, and
(iii) when θi,t is set to the optimizer θˆi,t in µi,t in (2.3), the resulting equilibrium price
drift — which we denote by µˆt — does not depend on the investor-specific private
information variables (a˜i, θi,−, θ
(0)
i,−). In other words, µi,t = µˆt when θi,t = θˆi,t.
♦
Requirement (iii) in Definition 2.1 means that equilibrium prices only depend on in-
dividual variables a˜i, θi,−, and θi,t via their impact on the aggregate target imbalance a˜Σ
and the market-clearing conditions (2.1) and (1.2). Thus, all investors perceive the same
equilibrium price drift. However, following Vayanos (1999), the function µ1(t) gives the
impact of investor i’s holdings on i’s perceived price drift µi,t both off-equilibrium (when
θi,t 6= θˆi,t) as well as in-equilibrium (when θi,t = θˆi,t).
A major challenge in constructing an equilibrium is the following: Market clearing
(1.2) requires at each time t ∈ [0, 1] that the strategic investors in aggregate absorb the
total shares wt inelastically supplied by the noise traders. However, in order to induce
the strategic investors to take a position θˆi,t that deviates from their ideal TWAP position
γ(t)(a˜i−θi,−)+θi,−, prices St must adjust to give them a sufficient expected return given the
inventory penalties they will incur.17 This is less problematic at dates t < 1 because prices St
during the day are flexible. However, the fact that prices must converge to either a terminal
liquidating dividend (1.6) or to an inventory-adjusted overnight price (1.4) restricts the
wiggle room for providing the market-clearing price inducement as time t ↑ 1. The analysis
becomes particularly subtle for penalty severities κ(t) that explode as t ↑ 1. However, we
construct equilibria for a large class of unbounded functions κ(t) as well as for all bounded
non-negative continuous penalty functions.
Theorem 2.2 below gives restrictions on the pricing functions in (2.4) for existence of
an equilibrium. As we shall see, there is one degree of freedom in the pricing coefficients
µ0(t), ..., µ5(t), and so there are multiple (indeed, infinitely many) equilibria. The intu-
ition for the multiplicity of equilibria is the following: By design, the drift (2.3) is linearly
impacted by θi,t as well as by (a˜Σ, a˜i, wt, w0, θi,−). As we shall see in Theorem 2.2 below, op-
timal holdings are linear in (a˜Σ, a˜i, wt, w0, θi,−) and inserting such linear holdings into (2.3)
17Section 8 extends the model to risk-averse utilities so that then dividend risk also matters.
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produces redundancy in the drift in terms of (a˜Σ, a˜i, wt, w0, θi,−). Leaving the function µ1(t)
as the free parameter leads to intuitive interpretations in terms of different possible price
impacts of orders. In Theorem 2.2 below, the second-order condition for optimality of the
investors’ optimal controls is a restriction on the function µ1 : [0, 1)→ R given by
µ1(t) < κ(t), t ∈ (0, 1). (2.6)
Our main equilibrium existence result is the following (proof in Appendix A):
Theorem 2.2. Let γ : [0, 1]→ [0,∞) be a continuous function, and let κ : [0, 1)→ (0,∞)
and µ1 : [0, 1)→ R be continuous and square integrable functions; i.e.,∫ 1
0
(
κ(t)2 + µ1(t)
2
)
dt <∞, (2.7)
that satisfy the second-order condition (2.6). Then an equilibrium exists in which:
(i) Investor optimal holdings θˆi in equilibrium are given by
θˆi,t =
wt
M
+
2κ(t)γ(t)
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
(
a˜i − a˜Σ
M
)
+
2κ(t)
(
1− γ(t))
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
(
θi,− − w0
M
)
. (2.8)
(ii) The equilibrium stock price is given by
St = g0(t) + g(t)a˜Σ + σw(t)wt +Dt, (2.9)
where the deterministic functions g0, g, and σw : [0, 1] → R are the unique solutions
of the following linear ODEs:
g′0(t) =
2κ(t)(γ(t)− 1)
M
w0 − ασw(t), g0(1) = 0,
g′(t) = −2γ(t)κ(t)
M
, g(1) = ϕ0,
σ′w(t) =
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
M
+ piσw(t), σw(1) = ϕ1.
(2.10)
(iii) The pricing functions µ0, µ2, µ3, µ4, and µ5 in (2.3) are given in terms of µ1 by (A.15)-
(A.19) in Appendix A.
Remark 2.1. We note several properties of this equilibrium here:
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1. The system of ODEs in (2.10) has the unique solution:
g0(t) = α
∫ 1
t
σw(u)du+ w0
∫ 1
t
2κ(u)
(
1− γ(u))
M
du, (2.11)
g(t) = ϕ0 +
∫ 1
t
2γ(s)κ(s)
M
ds, (2.12)
σw(t) = e
pi(t−1)ϕ1 −
∫ 1
t
epi(t−u)
2κ(u)− µ1(u)
M
du. (2.13)
This follows because the ODE for σw(t) is linear and, thus, has a unique solution,
which then uniquely determines g0(t). In addition, the boundary conditions in (2.10)
insure the terminal price condition (1.4) is satisfied at t = 1. Hence, the equilibrium
price in (2.9) can be written as
St =
[
α
∫ 1
t
σw(u)du+ w0
∫ 1
t
2κ(u)
(
1− γ(u))
M
du
]
+
[
ϕ0 +
∫ T
t
2γ(s)κ(s)
M
ds
]
a˜Σ
+
[
epi(t−1)ϕ1 +
∫ 1
t
epi(t−u)
µ1(u)− 2κ(u)
M
du
]
wt +Dt.
(2.14)
2. From (2.9), the initial stock price at t = 0 is
S0 = g0(0) + g(0)a˜Σ + σw(0)w0 +D0. (2.15)
Therefore, whenever the solution g(t) from (2.10) satisfies g(0) 6= 0, the aggregate
target a˜Σ can be inferred from S0 because w0 and D0 are constants. Thus, we have
σ(S0) = σ(a˜Σ) in (1.9), which produces the measurability equivalence in (1.8). From
(2.12), a sufficient condition for g(0) 6= 0 is γ(t) > 0 and κ(t) > 0 for some t ∈ (0, 1],
and ϕ0 ≥ 0. In that case, the optimal control θˆi,t in (2.8) can written as a linear
function of (a˜i, S0, St) where (S0, St) are given in (2.15) and (2.9).
3. From (2.9), the equilibrium price dynamics are given by
dSt =
[
g′0(t) + g
′(t)a˜Σ + σ′w(t)wt
]
dt+ σw(t)dwt + dDt
=
[
g′0(t) + g
′(t)a˜Σ + σ′w(t)wt + σw(t)(α− piwt)
]
dt+ σw(t)ηdBt + dDt.
(2.16)
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We define the equilibrium stock price drift µˆt by
µˆt := g
′
0(t) + g
′(t)a˜Σ + σ′w(t)wt + σw(t)(α− piwt)
=
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
M
wt +
2κ(t)
(
γ(t)− 1)
M
w0 − 2κ(t)γ(t)
M
a˜Σ.
(2.17)
The second equality in (2.17) follows from substitution of (2.10) into the first line of
(2.17). The quadratic variation of S and quadratic cross-variations between S and
(D,w) are given by
d〈S〉t =
(
σ2w(t)η
2 + 1
)
dt, d〈S,D〉t = dt, d〈S,w〉t = σw(t)η2dt. (2.18)
The intuition for the price dynamics in (2.16)-(2.17) is as follows: In contrast to
w0 and a˜Σ, which only affect prices over time through their predictable impact on
the market-clearing price drift, the noise-trader supply wt evolves stochastically over
time. As a result, wt affects price dynamics via two channels. First, the drift µˆt in
(2.17) required for market clearing at time t is increasing in the accumulated noise-
trader supply wt that the M strategic investors must hold at time t. Second, the
price dynamics dSt are decreasing in the random noise-trader shock dwt since σw(t)
in (2.13) is negative whenever ϕ1 ≤ 0. In particular, the integral in (2.13) for σw(t)
ensures that the contemporaneous fall in prices given dwt > 0 at time t is sufficient
to allow increased expected price drifts in the future.
4. From (2.9), we see that the equilibrium stock-price process is Gaussian. More specif-
ically, the price process (2.9) is a Bachelier model with time-dependent coefficients.
While the equilibrium stock price can be negative with positive probability, such Gaus-
sian models have been widely used in the market microstructure literature by, e.g.,
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Kyle (1985). Gaussian models are also widely used
in the optimal execution literature including Almgren and Chriss (1999, 2001); see,
e.g., the discussion in Section 3.1 in the Gatheral and Schied (2013) survey.
5. The difference St−Dt is the price effect of imbalances in liquidity supply and demand.
We call this the liquidity premium and note that it can be positive or negative depend-
ing on the aggregate target imbalance a˜Σ and on whether the noise traders are buying
or selling. From (2.9) and (2.14), the liquidity premium has (i) a deterministic compo-
nent g0(t) (due to any initial supply w0 and to predictable future noise-trader supply
trends α), (ii) deterministic effects g(t)a˜Σ due to the net strategic-investor target im-
balance a˜Σ, and (iii) a random component σw(t)wt due to the changing noise-trader
supply wt.
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6. Optimal investor holdings (2.8) have an intuitive structure in equilibrium. To see this,
we rearrange (2.8) as follows:
θˆi,t =
wt
M
+
2κ(t)
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
[
γ(t)
(
a˜i − a˜Σ
M
)
+
(
1− γ(t)) (θi,− − w0
M
)]
. (2.19)
The first term in (2.19) shows that strategic investors share the noise-trader supply
wt equally in equilibrium. The second term adjusts these equal positions to take into
account differences in different investors’ target trajectories subject to the market-
clearing constraint. The term in the square brackets is the difference between investor
i’s personal TWAP target trajectory γ(t)a˜i+
(
1−γ(t))θi,− and i’s pro rata share (i.e.,
one Mth) of the aggregate TWAP target trajectory γ(t) a˜ΣM + (1 − γ(t))w0M for all of
the strategic investors. This difference is scaled by the coefficient 2κ(t)2κ(t)−µ1(t) , which
depends on the particular equilibrium pinned down by the price-impact function µ1(t).
One immediate implication of (2.19) is that in equilibrium there is no predatory
trading since the signs of the coefficients on wt and a˜Σ do not switch over time. A
second implication is that an investor with an above-average target a˜i >
a˜Σ
M holds more
stock than an investor with a below-average target keeping θi,− fixed. This implication
follows because the second-order condition (2.6) implies that the coefficient 2κ(t)2κ(t)−µ1(t)
is positive. A third implication of (2.19) is that the difference a˜i − a˜ΣM becomes more
important than the difference θi,− − w0M in the investor’s holdings θˆi,t as γ(t) ↑ 1 as
t ↑ 1.
7. Investor i places a discrete order at time t = 0 but then trades continuously thereafter.
From (2.8), investor i’s initial trade is
θˆi,0 − θi,− = 2κ(0)γ(0)
2κ(0)− µ1(0)
(
a˜i − a˜Σ
M
)
+
[2κ(0)(1− γ(0))
2κ(0)− µ1(0) − 1
](
θi,− − w0
M
)
, (2.20)
which is generically non-zero when a˜i 6= a˜Σ/M and/or θi,− 6= w0/M .
8. The presence of wt in (2.8) implies that the θˆi,t holding paths are non-differentiable.
Consequently, there is no dt-rate at which buying and selling occur. However, when
κ(t), γ(t), and µ1(t) are smooth functions, the equilibrium holding paths have Itoˆ
dynamics
dθˆi,t =
1
M
(α− piwt)dt+ 1
M
ηdBt
+
[(
2κ(t)γ(t)
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
)′ (
a˜i − a˜Σ
M
)
+
(
2κ(t)
(
1− γ(t))
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
)′ (
θi,− − w0
M
)]
dt.
(2.21)
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9. The holdings θˆi,t of investor i differ generically from i’s TWAP target trajectory. First,
this is because the strategic investors follow “smart” (i.e., optimized) strategies rather
than mechanical TWAP strategies with hard constraints. In particular, the squared
integrability condition (2.7) means that, even if the penalty severity κ(t) is unbounded
as t ↑ 1, the TWAP penalties still lead to a soft, rather than a hard, constraint relative
to the investor’s target trajectory. Second, market clearing leads to prices such that
the M strategic investors, in aggregate, take the other side of the noise-trader orders
throughout the day. From (2.19) and Remark 2.1.6 above, the equilibrium deviations
of investor holdings θˆi,t from their TWAP trajectory at time t are
θˆi,t −
[
θi,− + γ(t)(a˜i − θi,−)
]
=
wt
M
+
µ1(t)
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
[
γ(t)a˜i +
(
1− γ(t))θi,−]
− 2κ(t)
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
[
γ(t)
a˜Σ
M
+
(
1− γ(t))w0
M
]
.
(2.22)
In other words, the TWAP deviation for investor i consists of their share of the noise-
trader order plus additional components tied to investor i’s personal TWAP trajectory
and the aggregate target trajectory in ways that depend on µ1(t).
The average target error in any equilibrium is always the pro rata share of the noise-
trader supply less the pro rata share of the aggregate TWAP target trajectory∑M
i=1 θˆi,t
M
−
∑M
i=1
[
θi,− + γ(t)(a˜i − θi,−)
]
M
=
wt
M
−
[w0
M
+ γ(t)
( a˜Σ
M
− w0
M
)]
. (2.23)
However, in all equilibria with µ1(t) 6= 0, there is generically cross-section dispersion
in individual investor target deviations around the average target deviation
θˆi,t −
[
θi,− + γ(t)(a˜i − θi,−)
]− wt
M
+
[w0
M
+ γ(t)
( a˜Σ
M
− w0
M
)]
=
µ1(t)
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
[
γ(t)
(
a˜i − a˜Σ
M
)
+
(
1− γ(t))(θi,− − w0
M
)]
.
(2.24)
10. A special case of interest is an arithmetic Brownian motion noise-trader imbalance
process (pi := 0) and equal initial sharing (θi,− := w0M ). From (2.8), the conditional
expected investor holdings at time t in this case are
E[θˆi,t|σ(a˜i, a˜Σ)] = w0 + αt
M
+
2κ(t)γ(t)
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
(
a˜i − a˜Σ
M
)
. (2.25)
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From (2.21) the resulting conditional variance of investor holdings is given by
V[θˆi,t|σ(a˜i, a˜Σ)] = η
2t
M2
, (2.26)
which is independent of the private target a˜i.
The equilibrium in Theorem 2.2 has the following comparative statistics:
Corollary 2.3. In the setting of Theorem 2.2, we have:
(i) The function σw(t) is increasing in µ1(t) and M , decreasing in κ(t), and independent
of γ(t), α, and η.
(ii) When ϕ1 ≤ 0 in (1.4), σw(t) is non-positive and increasing in pi. Consequently,
liquidity |σw(t)| is decreasing in µ1(t), pi, and M and increasing in κ(t).
(iii) The conditional variance of the liquidity premium is
V[St −Dt|σ(a˜Σ)] = σw(t)2V[wt]. (2.27)
Proof. The linear ODE (2.10) for σw(t) has the unique solution (2.13). This produces the
first two claims in the corollary. The third claim follows from the representation of St−Dt
using (2.9). ♦
Empirical prediction 1: Corollary 2.3 leads to a set of empirical predictions about chang-
ing market conditions across different days. In particular, suppose that on different days
there are different numbers of strategic investors M , penalty severities κ(t), and speeds of
noise-trader order-flow mean-reversion pi. Corollary 2.3 predicts that price volatility and
market illiquidity, as measured by |σw(t)η|, should be higher on days on which there are
fewer strategic investors (to share the noise-trader order flow), stronger TWAP penalties,
less noise-trader order-flow mean reversion, and greater noise-trader supply volatility η.
Empirical prediction 2: Our model predicts two types of intraday patterns in pricing.
The first prediction is that liquidity effects due to known imbalances and trends in the
noise-trader supply w0 and α and the target imbalances a˜Σ lead to ex ante predictable
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intraday drifts in prices. Taking the conditional expectation of (2.17) gives us
E[µˆt|σ(a˜Σ)]
=
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
M
E[wt] +
2κ(t)
(
γ(t)− 1)
M
w0 − 2κ(t)γ(t)
M
a˜Σ (2.28)
=
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
M
(
w0e
−pit +
α
pi
(1− e−pit))+ 2κ(t)(γ(t)− 1)
M
w0 − 2κ(t)γ(t)
M
a˜Σ
=
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
M
α
pi
(1− e−pit) + 2κ(t)
(
e−pit + γ(t)− 1)− µ1(t)
M
w0 − 2κ(t)γ(t)
M
a˜Σ.
Thus, prices should predictably drift up on days on which there is a ex ante predictable
increase in supply spread out over the trading day (expected prices rise to induce the
strategic investors to absorb α > 0 over time) and on which there is a negative aggregate
target imbalance (expected prices rise to discourage strategic investor selling given a˜Σ < 0).
The impact of the initial supply w0 on prices is more complicated since it has both a
direct effect on E[µˆt|σ(a˜Σ)] and an indirect effect as the starting point for wt. The second
prediction is that if the speed-of-mean-reversion pi is sufficiently low, then the volatility
V[St −Dt] of the liquidity premium in (2.27) is non-monotone over the trading day. This
follows from (2.9) and the fact that V[wt] starts at 0 at time 0 and grows monotonically over
the trading day while, from (2.13), the absolute value of the price impact loading |σw(t)| is
monotonically decreasing over the trading day when pi is not too large.
A natural question is about the impact of intraday trading targets on financial markets.
There are two natural comparisons for our model. One comparison is a competitive market
(see Example 3.1 below) with negligible trading targets. Given risk neutrality, this corre-
sponds to an equilibrium where κ(t) is small, µ1(t) := 0 for all t ∈ [0, 1], and ϕ0 := ϕ1 := 0.
In the limit in this case, the M risk-neutral strategic agents share the supply of shares from
the noise traders equally in (2.8) and prices are just the current dividend value Dt from
(2.9). Comparing this case with our model in which κ(t) is large, shows that trading targets
induce a random liquidity premium in prices and make markets less liquid. A second and
more nuanced comparison is a market in which the strategic investors have terminal trading
targets a˜i at the end of the day but do not have intraday target trajectories. This corre-
sponds to a penalty severity κ(t) that is negligible during the day but positive at the end
of the day. Our next result shows that intraday TWAP benchmarking increases intraday
price volatility and market illiquidity.
Corollary 2.4. In the setting of Theorem 2.2, we have the following: For fixed t¯ ∈ (0, 1) and
ϕ1 ≤ 0, we let two penalty-severity functions κ(t) and κ(t) be ordered such that κ(t) < κ(t)
for times t ∈ [0, t¯) and κ(t) = κ(t) for t ∈ [t¯, 1]. Then, given µ1(t) < κ(t), price volatility
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and illiquidity are less in the market with κ(t) than in the market with κ(t) .
Proof. The claim follows from Corollary 2.3(ii). ♦
This does not mean TWAP and VWAP incentives are inefficient. Rather, it means that
TWAP and VWAP as solutions to delegated-trading agency problems are not socially cost-
less.
3 Multiple equilibria
Our model has multiple equilibria, each uniquely pinned down by a choice of the price-
impact function µ1(t). This section considers some theoretically motivated examples of
µ1(t) functions. In addition, Section 4 constructs µ1(t) based on an empirical calibration.
Example 3.1 (Radner). In a fully competitive Radner equilibrium, the perceived price
process (St)t∈[0,1] is unaffected by investor i’s holdings θi,t. In particular, the Radner price-
taking condition says that the price dynamics perceived by investor i are independent of
any amount θi,t held by investor i. This case sets the investor order price-impact function
in (2.3) to
µ1(t) := 0, for all t ∈ [0, 1]. (3.1)
This independence is stronger than the equilibrium requirement (iii) in Definition 2.1, which
requires the price dynamics perceived by investor i to be independent of investor i’s stock
holdings only for the equilibrium holdings θˆi,t but not for arbitrary holdings.
In the Radner case with µ1(t) := 0, all M investors have, from (2.22), identical TWAP
deviations equal to the average deviation in (2.23). In other words, investors share the
noise-trader orders and the aggregate target shortfall equally. In contrast, when µ1(t) 6= 0
(as in the next two examples below), the TWAP deviations (2.22) differ across investors
depending on their individual targets a˜i. ♦
Example 3.2 (Welfare maximization). There are many ways to measure social welfare
(see, e.g., Section 6.1 in Vayanos (1999)). We follow Du and Zhu (2017) and their Equation
(42) and consider maximizing an expected aggregate certainty-equivalent criterion for the
M strategic investors. The certainty equivalent CEi ∈ R for strategic investor i is defined
as
CEi := V (Xi,0, w0, a˜i, a˜Σ) (3.2)
where V is the value function defined in (1.13). The certainty equivalent (3.2) follows
from the assumption that all strategic investors are risk neutral, (i.e., their utilities are
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Ui(x) := x). We are interested in the price-impact function µ
∗
1 : [0, 1)→ R that maximizes
the objective equal to total welfare of the M strategic investors
µ∗1(t) ∈ argmaxµ1(t)
M∑
i=1
E[CEi]. (3.3)
The objective (3.3) is ex ante in that the expectation E is taken over the random private-
information variables (θ
(0)
1,−, ..., θ
(0)
M,−), (θ1,−, ..., θM,−), and (a˜1, ..., a˜M ). Theorem 5.1 in Sec-
tion 5 gives sufficient conditions for existence of the welfare-maximizing equilibrium. ♦
Example 3.3 (Vayanos). Vayanos (1999) considers investor demand curves in a discrete-
time model with trading times 0 ≤ t0 < t1 < ... < tN ≤ 1. The discretized version of our
market-clearing condition (2.5) is
∆wtn =
∑
k 6=i
∆θk,tn + ∆θi,tn . (3.4)
Similar to Vayanos (1999), suppose the trades ∆θk,tn of investors k 6= i are linear functions
of Stn . Solving (3.4) for Stn gives that the price-impact function that investor i faces in her
optimization problem is linear in the difference ∆wtn −∆θi,tn . To convert this restriction
into our continuous-time setting, we conjecture that equilibrium holdings for all investors
are symmetric and have the form
θk,t = F0(t)a˜Σ + F1(t)(St −Dt) + F2(t)a˜k + F3(t) (3.5)
for common deterministic functions F0(t), ..., F3(t).
18 When all investors use (3.5), the
clearing condition (1.2) ensures that the equilibrium price St satisfies
wt =
(
MF0(t) + F2(t)
)
a˜Σ +MF1(t)(St −Dt) +MF3(t). (3.6)
The solution St of (3.6) whenever F1(t) 6= 0 can be written as
St = g0(t) + g(t)a˜Σ + σw(t)wt +Dt, (3.7)
where the coefficient functions are
g0(t) := −F3(t)
F1(t)
, g(t) := −MF0(t) + F2(t)
MF1(t)
, σw(t) :=
1
MF1(t)
. (3.8)
18For simplicity, we set w0 := 0 and θi,− := 0 for all investors in this example.
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Itoˆ’s lemma produces the equilibrium price dynamics
dSt = dDt + σw(t)dwt + a˜Σg
′(t)dt+ wtσ′w(t)dt+ g
′
0(t)dt
= dDt + σw(t)(αdt+ ηdBt) + a˜Σg
′(t)dt+ g′0(t)dt
+
(
σ′w(t)− piσw(t)
)((
MF0(t) + F2(t)
)
a˜Σ +MF1(t)(St −Dt)
)
dt,
(3.9)
where the second equality uses (3.6).
To verify that (3.9) fits into our price-impact model (2.2)-(2.3), we adapt an argument
from Vayanos (1999). When investor i is free to use any holding process but all other
investors use (3.5), the market-clearing condition (2.5) becomes
wt =
∑
k 6=i
(
F0(t)a˜Σ + F1(t)(St −Dt) + F2(t)a˜k +MF3(t)
)
+ θi,t
= (M − 1)F0(t)a˜Σ + (M − 1)F1(t)(St −Dt) + F2(t)(a˜Σ − a˜i) + (M − 1)F3(t) + θi,t.
(3.10)
Provided that F1(t) 6= 0 and M ≥ 2, we can solve for St in (3.10) to get
St = Dt +
wt − (M − 1)F0(t)a˜Σ − F2(t)(a˜Σ − a˜i)− (M − 1)F3(t)− θi,t
(M − 1)F1(t) . (3.11)
Substituting (3.11) for St −Dt into the dynamics (3.9) gives
dSt = dDt + σw(t)(αdt+ ηdBt) + a˜Σg
′(t)dt+ g′0(t)dt
+
(
σ′w(t)− piσw(t)
)((
MF0(t) + F2(t)
)
a˜Σ
+M
wt − (M − 1)F0(t)a˜Σ − F2(t)(a˜Σ − a˜i)− (M − 1)F3(t)− θi,t
(M − 1)
)
dt.
(3.12)
Therefore, in this example the coefficients in front of wt and −θi,t in the drift of St are
identical. In turn, this corresponds to requiring in (2.3) that
µ1(t) = −µ3(t), t ∈ [0, 1). (3.13)
When we add restriction (3.13), our model produces a unique equilibrium with19
µ1(t) =
2κ(t)
2−M , t ∈ [0, 1). (3.14)
Consequently, the second-order condition (2.6) holds in this example whenever there are at
19To derive (3.14), we solve (A.17) and (3.13) simultaneously for µ1(t) and µ3(t).
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least M ≥ 3 strategic investors. In this case, µ1(t) given by (3.14) is negative.
We conclude by relating investor demand curves to the multiplicity of equilibria. To do
this, we extend (3.5) by adding a linear term in wt so that investor demand (3.5) becomes
θk,t = F0(t)a˜Σ + F1(t)(St −Dt) + F2(t)a˜k + F3(t) + F4(t)wt, (3.15)
for a deterministic function F4(t). Adjusting the arguments above produces an extension
of (3.12) without the requirement (3.13). In other words, (3.15) leads to our model (2.3)
with µ1(t) now free. ♦
4 Calibration
Our model can be calibrated empirically using two different approaches. One approach cali-
brates an implied µ1(t) function to make the optimal holding formula (2.8) match empirical
data on how brokers divide parent trading targets a˜i− θi,− into a series of child orders (see
O’Hara (2015)). However, such data are proprietary and typically known only by clients
and brokers.
A second approach — which is our focus here — calibrates our model to a continuous-
time empirical price-impact model where
dSMktt := λ(t)(µ
Y
t dt+ dBt) + dDt, (4.1)
where λ(t) is a smooth deterministic function, and the arriving signed public aggregate
order-flow dynamics µYt dt + dBt have a drift µ
Y
t and are normalized to have a quadratic
variation of one. The goal is to take an estimated differentiable function λ(t) as a calibration
input and derive the corresponding implied µ1(t) function in (2.3). When pi := 0 in (1.3)
to match the un-autocorrelated order dynamics in (4.1), Theorem 2.2 gives the equilibrium
ODE for the loading σw(t) as
σ′w(t) =
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
M
, σw(1) = ϕ1. (4.2)
Consequently, given an estimated λ(t) function in (4.1), we need to solve
λ(t) = σw(t)η, λ(1) = ϕ1η. (4.3)
Differentiating (4.3) and using (2.10) and pi = 0 give µ1(t) in terms of λ
′(t) as
µ1(t) = 2κ(t)− Mλ
′(t)
η
, ϕ1 =
λ(1)
η
, (4.4)
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provided that the solution in (4.4) satisfies the second-order condtion (2.6).
Empirical prediction 3: The calibration condition in (4.4) requires that the empirical
slope of the price-impact function λ′(t) must be positive and sufficiently large in order for
the second-order condition (2.6) to hold. This restriction is interpreted as follow: Since
our order-flow sign convention implies a negative price impact of the noise-trader supply of
shares wt to the market, this means λ(t) < 0, and so a positive derivative λ
′(t) means that
the price impact is decreasing in absolute value over the day. This prediction is roughly
consistent with an approximately declining pattern in the intraday trading-time-contingent
price impacts estimated in Barardehi and Bernhardt (2018, Table 4).20
5 Welfare analysis
Risk neutrality of the strategic investors lets us decompose the expected aggregate certainty
equivalent into two components tied to expected wealth and expected penalties
M∑
i=1
E[CEi] =
M∑
i=1
E[Xi,1]−
M∑
i=1
E[Li,1]. (5.1)
To simplify the exposition, this section assumes parameter restrictions
pi := 0, θi,− :=
w0
M
, ϕ0 := ϕ1 := 0. (5.2)
The market-clearing condition (2.5) and the ODEs (2.10) produce
M∑
i=1
E[Xi,1] =
M∑
i=1
(
S0θˆi,0 + θˆ
(0)
i,0 +
∫ 1
0
E[θˆi,tµˆt]dt
)
= S0w0 +
∫ 1
0
E[wtµˆt]dt
= ...+
(
g0(0) + σw(0)w0
)
w0 −
∫ 1
0
E[w2t ]
µ1(t)
M
dt
= ...+
∫ 1
0
(
αw0t+ w
2
0 − E[w2t ]
)µ1(t)
M
dt,
(5.3)
20The model has other parameters and functions to calibrate empirically. The TWAP functions κ(t)
and γ(t) can be assumed to be stable over time and can be estimated via GMM moment-matching. The
imbalances w0 and a˜Σ and the number of strategic investors M are not directly observable and presumably
vary from one day to the next. Thus, they can be estimated by daily implied calibration to match changing
realized price trends for each day in the sample. Some of the noise-trader parameters α, pi, and η may be
intertemporal constants and estimated via GMM, while others may take changing daily values and, thus,
must be imputed by daily implied calibration.
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where we write “...” for terms that do not depend on µ1(t). Consequently, we can find
functions f = f(µ, t) and h = h(µ, t) such that
M∑
i=1
E[Xi,1] =
∫ 1
0
f(µ1(t), t)dt, (5.4)
M∑
i=1
E[Li,1] =
∫ 1
0
E
[
κ(t)
(
γ(t)(a˜i − w0
M
)− (θˆi,t − w0
M
)
)2]
dt =
∫ 1
0
h(µ1(t), t)dt. (5.5)
To understand the difference between the Radner equilibrium with µ1(t) = 0 and the
welfare-maximizing equilibrium with µ1(t) = µ
∗
1(t) maximizing (5.1), consider
f(µ1(t), t)− f(0, t) = µ1(t)w0(w0 + αt)− E[w
2
t ]
M
, (5.6)
h(µ1(t), t)− h(0, t) = µ1(t)2 γ(t)
2κ(t)(
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
)2( M∑
i=1
E[a˜2i ]−
E[a˜2Σ]
M
)
. (5.7)
There are two points to note about (5.7). First, (5.7) is independent of the noise-trader
dynamics dwt, i.e., none of the constants (w0, α, η) appear. Second, the difference (5.7) is
non-negative and minimized at µ1(t) := 0, which is the Radner equilibrium. In contrast,
the difference (5.6) is linear in µ1(t) and its slope is determined by the constants (w0, α, η).
The following result describes properties of welfare-maximizing equilibria in different
regions of the parameter space (proof in Appendix A).
Theorem 5.1. Let γ : [0, 1]→ [0,∞) be a continuous function, and let κ : [0, 1)→ (0,∞)
be continuous and square integrable. We assume that E[a˜2i ] <∞ for i ∈ {1, ...,M}, and we
let (5.2) hold.
(i) When the two additional parameter restrictions
4γ(t)2
(
E[a˜2Σ]−M
M∑
i=1
E[a˜2i ]
)
< t(η2 + α2t+ αw0) < 0, t ∈ (0, 1], (5.8)
hold, there exists a unique non-negative continuous price-impact function µ∗1 : [0, 1)→
R that attains
sup
µ1(t)
M∑
i=1
E[CEi], (5.9)
where the supremum is taken over all continuous and square integrable functions µ1 :
[0, 1) → R satisfying the second-order condition (2.6). Furthermore, the maximizer
µ∗1(t) is linear in κ(t) in that the time-dependent ratio
µ∗1(t)
κ(t) is independent of κ(t).
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(ii) For αw0 ≥ 0, the critierion (5.9) does not have a maximizer and the welfare-maximizing
equilibrium does not exist.
(iii) For η := α := 0, the critierion (5.9) is maximized by µ∗1(t) = 0.
Remark 5.1. We note some features of this result:
1. The two restrictions in (5.8) are sufficient conditions for a maximizer µ∗1(t) to exist.
The first inequality ensures that µ∗1(t) satisfies the second-order condition (2.6). The
second inequality in (5.8) — which requires αw0 to be sufficiently negative — is
a coercivity condition that ensures that very negative values of µ∗1(t) can never be
optimal. While the simple TWAP target trajectory γ(t) := t is included in Theorem
2.2, the first restriction in (5.8) prevents it from being included in Theorem 5.1.
2. The competitive Radner equilibrium — which minimizes aggregate expected TWAP
penalties — does not always maximize aggregate strategic-investor total welfare be-
cause the price-impact function µ1(t) also affects aggregate expected strategic-investor
wealth. In particular, initial strategic-investor wealth, given their initial holdings∑M
i=1 θˆi,0 = w0, depends on the initial market-clearing price S0 which, in equilibrium,
depends on µ1(t). In addition, the expected wealth the strategic investors can ex-
tract from trading over the day with the noise traders,
∫ 1
0 E[wtµˆt]dt, also depends on
µ1(t). The parameter restrictions in (5.8) affect the existence and size of the pos-
sible wealth effects. However, when the maximizer µ∗1(t) exists and is non-zero, the
expected wealth gains from µ∗1(t) > 0 come at the cost of additional dispersion from
(3.19) in investor deviations around their TWAP trajectories, which increases aggre-
gate expected TWAP penalty costs relative to the competitive Radner equilibrium.
3. Even though the welfare-maximizing equilibrium does not exist when αw0 ≥ 0, the
Radner equilibrium still exists. In the next section on numerics we consider a case
with αw0 < 0 so that the welfare-maximizer exists.
4. The last part of Theorem 5.1 implies that a constant stock supply (i.e., wt = w0
for all t ∈ [0, 1]) makes the welfare-maximizing equilibrium identical to the Radner
equilibrium.
Surprisingly, the linearity property of µ∗1(t) in Theorem 5.1 implies that in the welfare-
maximizing case in Example 3.2, the expected holdings (2.25) also do not depend on the
penalty severity κ(t). In addition, from (2.21) the drift in investor i’s optimal holdings
when θi,− := w0M is
α
M
+
(
2κ(t)γ(t)
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
)′ (
a˜i − a˜Σ
M
)
. (5.10)
25
This is a deterministic function of investor i’s private target a˜i and the public aggregate
variable a˜Σ defined in (1.5). In the welfare-maximizing case, (5.10) is independent of κ(t).
6 Numerics
This section compares model outcomes of the welfare-maximizing equilibrium (Example 3.2
with µ∗1(t) > 0), the fully competitive Radner equilibrium (Example 3.1), and the Vayanos
equilibrium (Example 3.3). The objects of interest are first, the shape of the welfare-
maximizing price-impact function µ∗1(t) for (5.9); second, properties of the equilibrium price
St in (2.9); third, how the smart TWAP traders and market makers share the available
supply wt given their individual heterogeneous target holdings a˜i; and four, welfare. The
numerical properties here all illustrate analytic derivations in Section 2.
Our analysis uses the terminal stock-price restriction (1.6) with an initial dividend factor
normalized to D0 := 20 and M := 10 strategic investors. For the dynamics of the noise-
trader process w in (1.3), we use the parameter values
w0 := 10, α := −1, pi := 0, η := 1. (6.1)
The strategic investors’ private information variables are21
θ
(0)
i,− := 0, θi,− :=
w0
M
= 1, a˜i ⊥ a˜j for i 6= j, E[a˜i] = 0, E[a˜2i ] = 1. (6.2)
Under these assumptions, the aggregate variable a˜Σ in (1.5) has the moments
E[a˜Σ] = 0, E[a˜2Σ] = M = 10. (6.3)
The units here can be interpreted as follows: The initial expectation of future dividends is
$20 per share (D0), and the daily volatility of dividend value changes is normalized to $1.
In aggregate, 10 strategic investors (M) share equally an initial supply of 10 million shares
from noise traders (w0) who are expected to sell 1 million shares on this particular day (α)
with a daily trading volatility also of 1 million shares (η).
For the penalty process Li,t in (1.1), the target-ratio function is
γ(t) := 0.1 + 0.9t, t ∈ [0, 1]. (6.4)
This target ratio function γ(t) can be interpreted as a modified TWAP target trajectory
21The quantities (θ
(0)
i,−, θi,−, a˜i) and the moments for a˜i are only used to (i) compute the welfare-maximizer
µ∗1(t), the optimal holdings, and other properties in the welfare-maximizing equilibrium and (ii) in the ex
ante welfare analysis below.
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in which traders are initially impatient to get part of their trading done quickly, but then
become more patient during the rest of the day.22 We consider four different penalty-severity
functions {κ1(t), ..., κ4(t)} defined by
κ1(t) := 1, t ∈ [0, 1],
κ2(t) := 1 + t, t ∈ [0, 1],
κ3(t) :=
9
8
(1− t)−0.25, t ∈ [0, 1),
κ4(t) :=

.0002 for t ∈ [0, .75],
2.3791 + 11.8954(t− 0.95) for t ∈ [.75, .95],
9
8(1− t)−0.25 for t ∈ [.95, 1).
(6.5)
A natural baseline is κ1(t) where the penalty severity is constant over the day. The next
two functions, κ2(t) and κ3(t), are both strictly greater than κ1(t). Comparing results for
them vs. κ1(t) illustrates how greater penalty severity affects market conditions. Note that
κ2(t) and κ3(t) both integrate to
3
2 over t ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, comparing results for κ2(t) vs.
κ3(t) shows how market conditions change with different intraday penalty-severity patterns
while holding the total daily penalty severity fixed. In particular, κ2(t) is bounded whereas
κ3(t) explodes as t ↑ 1 (although κ3(t) still satisfies the square integrability condition (2.7)).
An exploding terminal penalty severity like κ3(t) is another natural case of interest.
With function κ4(t), the end-of-day penalty severities are identical to κ3(t), but the
intraday penalty severities are negligible (close to zero) before t = 0.75. Comparing results
for κ3(t) vs. κ4(t) illustrates how intraday penalties affect market conditions beyond any
fixed terminal penalty severities. Consistent with Corollary 2.4, when early intraday trading
penalties are negligible, then the early-in-the-day market liquidity is high (i.e., σw(t) is
close to zero) and the liquidity premium St − Dt is smaller with lower volatility relative
to an otherwise similar market with meaningful intraday penalties in addition to terminal
penalties. This illustrates that intraday TWAP penalties can have a material impact on
intraday price dynamics.
Figure 1 shows the welfare-maximizing function µ∗1(t) (Plot A) and the Vayanos µ1(t)
in (3.14) (Plot B) for the different penalty-severities in (6.5). Comparing µ∗1(t) for penalties
κ1(t) vs. κ2(t) and for κ3(t) vs. κ4(t) in Plot A, we note that the stronger the penalty
severity κ(t), the larger is the welfare-maximizing µ∗1(t) function. For example, the positive
slopes of κ2(t) and κ3(t) in (6.5) imply that the penalty severity is greater later in the
day relative to κ1(t). As a result, we see that the welfare-maximizer µ
∗
1(t) gets larger later
in the day, the steeper the slope is of the penalty-severity function κ(t). This effect is
22Because γ(0) > 0, a welfare-maximizing equilibrium exists with µ∗1(t) > 0 (see Remark 5.1.1).
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most apparent for κ3(t) which explodes toward the end of the day. For κ4(t), the welfare-
maximizing µ∗1(t) is close to zero for most of the day. This follows directly from the second-
order condition (2.6) and the non-negativity of µ∗1(t) from Theorem 5.1. Thus, µ∗1(t) for
κ3(t) is greater than for κ4(t) until the end of the day when they converge.
The above suggests a reason for why the welfare-maximizing equilibrium can differ
from the competitive Radner equilibrium. A larger penalty severity κ(t) increases expected
TWAP deviation costs from accommodating the inelastic noise-trader order-flow wt. Con-
sequently, equilibrium prices must adjust more to induce the strategic investors to clear the
market. Intuitively, this is what a larger welfare-maximizer µ∗1(t) does via its endogenous
effect on prices in (2.9) through g0(t) and σw(t) in (2.10).
Figure 1: The welfare-maximizer µ1(t) := µ
∗
1(t) (Plot A) and the Vayanos µ1(t) defined in
(3.14) (Plot B). The parameters are given by (6.2)-(6.5), and the discretization divides the
day into 1000 trading rounds.
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Our second topic is pricing. Figure 2 shows the price-loading function σw(t) in (2.9).
The sign of σw(t) is negative because a larger wt means that the strategic investors must
buy more (i.e., our sign convention is that wt is the amount noise traders supply). The
greater the penalty severity κ(t) is, the more sensitive prices are to shocks in the amount wt
the strategic investors must absorb from the noise traders. For example, a greater supply
wt depresses prices more (in order to induce the strategic traders to buy), and the amount
prices must be depressed is increasing in the penalty for strategic-investor deviations from
their intraday target trading trajectory. In contrast, when the intraday penalty severity
is low, as with κ4(t) during the day, the price impacts are smaller. We also note that
the patterns in the price impacts are robust across the Radner, welfare-maximizing, and
Vayanos equilibria for each of the four κ(t) penalty severities in (6.5). This robustness is a
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general finding of other properties of pricing (see the Internet Appendix), but we will see
next that investor holdings can differ qualitatively across the three equilibria.
Figure 2: Equilibrium price loading σw(t) on noise-trader supply in the maximizing-welfare
equilibrium with µ1(t) := µ
∗
1(t) (Plot A), in the competitive Radner equilibrium with
µ1(t) := 0 (Plot B), and in the Vayanos equilibrium with µ1(t) defined in (3.14) (Plot
C). The parameters are given by (6.2)-(6.5), and the discretization divides the day into
1000 trading rounds
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Our third topic is the strategic-investor holdings in equilibrium. From (2.5), their ag-
gregate holdings are constrained by market clearing to equal the inelastic supply wt from
the noise traders. However, there is heterogeneity in individual investors’ holdings given
imbalances in their initial holdings θi,− and differences in their trading targets a˜i. This
heterogeneity is scaled by the coefficient 2κ(t)2κ(t)−µ1(t) in equation (2.19). These coefficient
functions are independent of κ(t) in Figure 3 because Theorem 5.1 ensures that µ∗1(t) is
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linear in κ(t) in the welfare-maximizing case and by (3.14) in the Vayanos case. In the
competitive Radner case the scaling coefficient is one because µ1(t) = 0.
Figure 3: Scaling ratio 2κ(t)2κ(t)−µ1(t) for θˆi,t in (2.19) for the welfare-maximizer µ1(t) := µ
∗
1(t),
the competitive equilibrium with µ1(t) := 0, and the Vayanos µ1(t) defined in (3.14). The
parameters are given by (6.2)-(6.5), and the discretization divides the day into 1000 trading
rounds.
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Next, we turn to investor i’s expected trades. Combining (2.25) with the initial position
θi,− := w0M from (6.2) gives
E[θˆi,t|σ(a˜i, a˜Σ)]− θi,− = αt
M
+
2κ(t)
2κ(t)− µ1(t)γ(t)
(
a˜i − a˜Σ
M
)
. (6.6)
Consequently, from (2.22) with parameters in (6.1)-(6.5), investor i expects to deviate from
her target trajectory by
E[θˆi,t|σ(a˜i, a˜Σ)]−
[
θi,− + γ(t)
(
a˜i − θi,−)
]
=
αt
M
+
2κ(t)γ(t)
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
(
a˜i − a˜Σ
M
)
− γ(t)(a˜i − w0
M
).
(6.7)
In the competitive Radner equilibrium from Example 3.1 where µ1(t) := 0, the difference
(6.7) does not depend on the target a˜i when a˜Σ is fixed and also does not depend on the
severity κ(t) of the penalty. Remarkably, Theorem 5.1 ensures that the difference (6.7) also
remains independent of κ(t) for the welfare-maximizer µ∗1(t).
Figure 4 shows the expected deviation between a strategic investor’s holdings up through
time t ∈ [0, 1] and their corresponding target. In this figure, we change the target a˜i of a
particular individual investor i while holding the targets of the other M − 1 = 9 investors
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fixed at a˜j := 1, j 6= i. Thus, both a˜i and a˜Σ = a˜i + 9 change in these plots. The figure
shows that if investor i wants to hold a large target quantity (e.g., a˜i = 5 or 15), then in
the welfare-maximizing equilibrium she trades ahead of her target early in the day but then
eventually falls behind. This pattern is noticeably different from the Radner and Vayanos
equilibria.
Figure 4: Conditional expected TWAP deviation E[θˆi,t|σ(a˜i, a˜Σ)]−
(
θi,− + γ(t)
(
a˜i − θi,−)
)
with the welfare-maximizer µ1(t) := µ
∗
1(t) (Plot A), the competitive equilibrium with
µ1(t) := 0 (Plot B), and the Vayanos µ1(t) defined in (3.14) (Plot C). The parameters
are given by (6.2)-(6.5), a˜j := 1 for j 6= i, a˜Σ := 9 + a˜i, and the discretization divides the
day into 1000 trading rounds.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
t
-3.0-2.5
-2.0-1.5
-1.0-0.5
0.5
E[θi,t|σ(a˜i,a˜Σ)]-(θi,-+γ(t)(a˜i-θi,-))
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
t
-3.0-2.5
-2.0-1.5
-1.0-0.5
0.5
E[θi,t|σ(a˜i,a˜Σ)]-(θi,-+γ(t)(a˜i-θi,-))
A: [Welfare] a˜i := 0 (———), B: [Radner] a˜i := 0 (———),
a˜i := 5 (−−−), a˜i := 15 (− · − · −). a˜i := 5 (−−−), a˜i := 15 (− · − · −).
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
t
-3.0-2.5
-2.0-1.5
-1.0-0.5
0.5
E[θi,t|σ(a˜i,a˜Σ)]-(θi,-+γ(t)(a˜i-θi,-))
C: [Vayanos] κ1 (———),
κ2 (−−−), κ3 (− · − · −) κ4 (− · ·−).
Lastly, we turn to welfare in the three equilibria. Table 1 illustrates how the equilibria
perform in terms of the welfare objective (5.9). As discussed in Section 5, the investor
welfare gains in the welfare-maximizing equilibrium are due to profits from initial price
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effects and to trading with the noise traders.
Table 1: Expected welfare objective (5.9) for the welfare-maximizer µ1(t) := µ
∗
1(t) (Column
2), the competitive equilibrium with µ1(t) := 0 (Column 3), and the Vayanos µ1(t) defined
in (3.14) (Column 4). The parameters are given by (6.2)-(6.5) and D0 := 20.
κ(t) Welfare (Ex. 3.2) Radner (Ex. 3.1) Vayanos (Ex. 3.3)
κ1(t) = 1 196.052 196.008 195.863
κ2(t) = 1 + t 193.189 193.118 192.874
κ3(t) =
9
8(1 + t)
−0.25 192.840 192.769 192.518
κ4(t) from (6.5) 196.340 196.316 196.205
Table 2 uses the decompositions in (5.1) and the second line of (5.3) to break the
total strategic-investor welfare into contributions due the initial stock valuation effect, the
expected profits from trading with the noise investors, and the TWAP penalties. For brevity,
the results reported here are just shown for the welfare-maximization case. The initial
wealth component is large, which is not surprising given that the strategic investors are long
10 million shares of a stock paying expected future dividends of $20. More interestingly,
for these κ(t) penalty severities, the TWAP penalties are roughly a third to a half of the
expected intraday trading profits.
Table 2: Components of the expected welfare objective (5.9) for the welfare-maximizing
equilibrium. The parameters are given by (6.2)-(6.5) and D0 := 20.
κ(t) Welfare (5.9) S0w0
∫ 1
0 E[wtµˆt]dt
∑M
i=1 E[Li,1]
κ1(t) = 1 196.052 192.157 7.383 3.494
κ2(t) = 1 + t 193.189 186.747 12.793 6.006
κ3(t) =
9
8(1 + t)
−0.25 192.840 186.394 13.146 6.298
κ4(t) from (6.5) 196.340 193.992 5.548 3.167
7 VWAP extension
This section extends our model to include stochastic intraday target trajectories and then
relates this extension to a stylized version of VWAP benchmarking. For simplicity of expo-
sition, in this section we set
θi,− := w0 := 0. (7.1)
The following model is based on Frei and Westray (2015). Appendix B contains more
details about this extension including the analogue of Theorem 2.2 and its proof. In this
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extension, the deterministic TWAP target ratio γ(t) is replaced with a stochastic target
ratio γ = (γt)t∈[0,1], which is a ca`dla`g gamma bridge process that takes values in [0,1]. The
process γt starts at 0 at t = 0, and converges to 1 as t ↑ 1. See E´mery and Yor (2004) for
more details about gamma bridge processes. We assume the strategic investors all use an
identical target-ratio process. Thus, in this stochastic target extension, the penalty (1.1) is
replaced with
Li,t :=
∫ t
0
κ(s)
(
a˜iγs− − θi,s
)2
ds, t ∈ [0, 1]. (7.2)
Because γs = γs− for all but a countable subset of [0, 1], we can replace γs− with γs in (7.2)
without changing the resulting Lebesgue integral.
In this model, investor i’s filtration (1.7) is redefined as
Fi,t := σ(a˜Σ, a˜i, wu, Du, γu)u∈[0,t], t ∈ [0, 1], (7.3)
where the processes (w,D) are as before. Consequently, the strategic investor’s objective
(1.13) becomes
sup
θi∈Ai
E
[
X1 −
∫ 1
0
κ(t)
(
a˜iγt− − θi,t
)2
dt
∣∣∣Fi,0] . (7.4)
Because of γt’s inaccessible jumps, the controls inAi must be predictable (Ai from Definition
1.1 is redefined in Appendix B).
Any gamma process (and therefore any gamma bridge process) is necessarily indepen-
dent of the Brownian motions (D,B); see, e.g., Lemma 15.6 of Kallenberg (2002). Therefore,
to allow for dependency between the stock supply and the target ratio γt, we redefine the
noise-trader stock supply to be wt+ρa˜Σγt−, which now consists of two parts: The Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process wt in (1.3) plus a scaled component driven by the gamma bridge γt−.
Thus, the clearing condition (1.2) becomes
wt + ρa˜Σγt− =
M∑
i=1
θi,t, t ∈ [0, 1], (7.5)
for some constant ρ ∈ R.23 The constant ρ controls the dependence between the target
ratio and the stock supply (see Eq. (B.3) in Appendix B for the precise statement).
The economic interpretation of our stochastic target ratio process is that γt is an ob-
servable state variable used to benchmark order execution. For example, it might be the
23Multiplying ρ by a˜Σ in (7.5) produces simpler expressions in what follows and, when a˜Σ 6= 0, can be
done with no loss of generality.
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expectation of a broad market volume curve E[ voltvol1 |Fi,t] given a suitable definition of public
information for the broad market (i.e., not just for the single particular stock being traded
here but for all stocks). In this sense, the stochastic target model represents a type of gener-
alized VWAP benchmarking. However, if we want VWAP for one particular stock, this can
be done but then there are mathematical challenges. In particular, because Brownian mo-
tions have infinite first variation, volume is non-trivial to define. Thus, for a stock-specific
VWAP, we would need η = 0. In this case, γt is exactly the time t expectation of the daily
volume curve. Because γt is a gamma bridge, there is randomness in the total supply during
the day but the total supply at the end of the day is non-random since γ1 = 1.
24 Thus, the
extension of our model to single-stock VWAP is an interesting topic for future research.
Frei and Westray (2015) model the realized relative volume curve voltvol1 used for VWAP
benchmarking by γt. However, as discussed on page 617 in Frei and Westray (2015), this
presents a potential problem because the realized volume curve cannot be observed prior to
the end of the trading day. Later in this section, we show how the gamma bridge process
can be used to model the investors’ expected relative volume curve E[ voltvol1 |Fi,t] which — by
definition — is observed at time t.
Appendix B uses the arguments behind Theorem 3.1 in Frei and Westray (2015) to show
that the value function corresponding to the optimization problem (7.4) remains quadratic
when γt is added as a state-process and (2.2)-(2.3) are replaced by
dSt : = µi,tdt+ σw(t)ηdBt + dDt + σγ(t)a˜Σ
(
dγt − (1− γt−)ψ0(t)dt
)
,
µi,t : = µ1(t)θi,t + µ2(t)a˜Σγt− + µ3(t)wt + µ4(t)a˜iγt−.
(7.6)
Given a continuous function µ1(t) satisfying (2.6), Appendix B gives formulas for smooth
deterministic functions σw(t), σγ(t), µ2(t), µ3(t), and µ4(t) in terms of µ1(t) which produce
a unique equilibrium in the sense that (i)-(iii) hold in Definition 2.1. One new feature of
this extended model is that now there are two stochastic process, wt and γt, affecting prices
and strategic-investor holdings.
Theorem B.2 in Appendix B is the VWAP analogue of Theorem 2.2 in the TWAP
model. In particular, the ODEs (B.11) determining the coefficient functions σw(t) and
σγ(t) appearing in (7.6) show that σw(t) is still given by (2.13) whereas σγ(t) is given by
σγ(t) =
1
1− t
∫ 1
t
(1− u)2κ(u)(1− ρ) + µ1(u)ρ
M
du, t ∈ [0, 1), (7.7)
with limit σγ(t)→ 0 as t ↑ 1. The following corollary of Theorem B.2 is the VWAP analogue
of Corollary 2.3:
24Another complication is that defining volume in terms of the noise-trader supply omits crossed orders.
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Corollary 7.1. In the setting of Theorem B.2, we have:
(i) For ρ ≥ 1, the functions σw(t) and σγ(t) are increasing in µ1(t), decreasing in κ(t),
and independent of γ(t), α, and η.
(ii) The dynamics of the predictable quadratic variation of the liquidity premium are
d〈S −D〉t = σw(t)2η2dt+ σγ(t)2a˜2Σ(1− γt−)2ψ1(t)dt, (7.8)
where the deterministic function ψ1(t) is defined in (B.2).
Empirical Predictions 4: Price volatility and market liquidity have qualitatively similar
relations to the underlying model inputs as predicted in the TWAP model.
We conclude the section by linking the stochastic target ratio model to VWAP bench-
marking. To this end, we let vol = (volt)t∈[0,1] be an exogenous stochastic process for the
stock’s cumulative volume over time such that the relative cumulative volume process
volt
vol1
, t ∈ [0, 1], (7.9)
is zero initially, has non-decreasing paths, and has terminal value one. We note that voltvol1 is
not observable at time t < 1, so the ratio (7.9) cannot be used as a state-process.
The VWAP objective replacing (1.13) is
sup
θi∈Ai
E
[
X1 −
∫ 1
0
κ(t)
( volt
vol1
a˜i − θi,t
)2
dt
∣∣∣Fi,0] . (7.10)
While investor i’s position θi,t is adapted to the filtration Fi,t, investor i cannot use her
holdings θi,t to manipulate the intraday contractual volume weights
volt
vol1
(this is common
practice, see, e.g., in Madhavan (2002, Exhibit 1)). In other words, we make the assumption
that the strategic investors’ individual orders do not affect the volume ratio voltvol1 . In this
case, (7.10) can be replaced with the equivalent problem:
sup
θi∈Ai
E
[
X1 −
∫ 1
0
κ(t)
(
E
[
volt
vol1
∣∣∣Fi,t] a˜i − θi,t)2dt ∣∣∣Fi,0] , (7.11)
where Fi,t is investor i’s filtration.25 We model directly E
[
volt
vol1
∣∣∣Fi,t] as the gamma bridge
γt. In that case, (7.11) becomes (7.4) when Fi,t is defined by (7.3).26
25Even though (7.10) and (7.11) yield different objective values, they are equivalent in the sense that they
share the same maximizer.
26Alternatively, we can define volt
vol1
:= 1
2
(
γt+ γ¯t
)
where γt and γ¯t are independent gamma bridge processes
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8 Extension to exponential utilities
Appendix C extends our TWAP model with linear preferences for the strategic investors
as in (1.13) to exponential preferences. In other words, we replace Ui(x) := x used in
the previous sections with Ui(x) := −e−x/τ for a common risk tolerance parameter τ > 0.
One new feature of our exponential preference model is that it distinguishes trading risk
aversion — as reflected by the penalty severity κ(t) for divergences from the target trading
trajectory — and general risk aversion to both wealth and trading risk captured by the
common exponential risk tolerance parameter τ > 0. The analysis in Appendix C shows
that prices and stock holdings are again linear (but with modified ODEs) and that there is
again an infinite number of equilibria associated with different price-impact functions µ1(t).
See Theorem C.2 in Appendix C below for details.
9 Discussion
There are good reasons to think that the qualitative properties of our analysis are robust
even though the specific functional forms of prices and trading strategies depend on modeling
assumptions (e.g., Brownian motion dynamics and linear or exponential preferences). First,
flexibility in investor perceptions about how prices would respond to off-equilibrium orders
is likely a key factor leading to multiple equilibria. Second, the absence of manipulative
predatory trading is still likely with rational forward-looking liquidity provision. Third,
intraday liquidity is likely to be impaired by intraday trading target penalties relative to
just terminal end-of-day target penalties. Fourth, strategic investors with the ability to
take advantage of less flexible investors may be better off in less competitive equilibria.
Two aspects of the mathematical structure of our model play particularly important
roles in the tractability of our model. The first is that there are no random unknown jumps
in the noise-trader supply w0 at time t = 0 (i.e., the initial value w0 is a constant). With
this assumption, the aggregate target a˜Σ is inferable at time 0 and, as a result, there is no
need for filtering over time to learn the strategic-investor aggregate target. The second is
that the strategic investors are homogeneous in their TWAP or VWAP target ratios γ(t) or
γt and penalty severities κ(t) and differ only in their individual realized targets a˜1, ..., a˜M .
This leads to symmetry in the trading strategy coefficients used by the strategic investors.
Lastly, we comment on the numerical implementation. The model is characterized by
low dimensional state-processes that makes numerics fast to perform. Furthermore, the
that are zero at t = 0 and one at t = 1. Then (7.3) produces E[ volt
vol1
|Fi,t] = 12
(
γt + t) which — modulo a
deterministic function of time — fits into our setting. In addition, based on the analysis in the previous
sections, it is straightforward to modify our VWAP analysis to include VWAP target trajectories of the form
1
2
(
γ0(t) + γt
)
where γt is a gamma bridge process and γ0(t) is a deterministic function of time.
36
model’s linear structure makes the numerics stable. We have experimented substantially
with numerics related to both linear and exponential utility models and have not found any
instability concerns.
10 Conclusion
This paper has solved for continuous-time equilibria with endogenous liquidity provision
and intraday trading targets. We show how intraday target trajectories in trading induce
intraday patterns in investor positions and in prices. There are also potential extensions of
our model. First, it would be interesting to extend the model to allow for heterogeneity in
the strategic investors’ γ(t) and κ(t) penalty functions. Second, perhaps the most pertinent
extension would be to allow for randomness in w0 appearing in (1.3) in which case the initial
equilibrium stock price S0 cannot fully reveal the aggregate target a˜Σ. Such an extension
would naturally involve elements from filtering theory. Third, our gamma bridge analysis
can be extended to an integrated model of single-stock VWAP.
A Proofs
We start with a technical lemma, which is used in the proof of Theorem 2.2. The arguments
used in lemma’s proof are standard and can be found in, e.g., Chapter 7 in Lipster and
Shiryeav (2001) as well as in the appendix of Cheridito, Filipovic´, and Kimmel (2007). We
include the lemma for completeness.
Lemma A.1. Let the functions γ, κ, µ1, and σw be as in Theorem 2.2. The strictly positive
local martingale (hence, also a supermartingale) N = (Nt)t∈[0,1] defined by
Nt := e
− ∫ t0 λudZu− 12 ∫ t0 λ2udu, t ∈ [0, 1], (A.1)
is a martingale with respect to the (augmented) filtration Ft := σ(a˜Σ, Du, Bu)u∈[0,t] where
µˆt is defined by (2.17) and
λt :=
µˆt√
σw(t)2η2 + 1
, (A.2)
dZt :=
σw(t)ηdBt + dDt√
σw(t)2η2 + 1
, Z0 := 0. (A.3)
Proof. For (t, x, a) ∈ [0, 1]× R2 we start by defining the linear function
H(t, x, a) :=
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
M
x+
2κ(t)
(
γ(t)− 1)
M
w0 − 2κ(t)γ(t)
M
a, (A.4)
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and note that µˆt = H(t, wt, a˜Σ) from (2.17). We define the auxiliary process
dvt := (α− pivt)dt+ ηdBt − H(t, vt, a˜Σ)
σw(t)2η2 + 1
σw(t)η
2dt, v0 := w0. (A.5)
Inserting H from (A.4) into (A.5) produces the various drift-coefficient functions in dvt to
be
constant coefficient: α− 2κ(t)
(
γ(t)− 1)
M
σw(t)η
2
σw(t)2η2 + 1
w0,
vt coefficient: − pi − 2κ(t)− µ1(t)
M
σw(t)η
2
σw(t)2η2 + 1
,
a˜Σ coefficient:
2κ(t)γ(t)
M
σw(t)η
2
σw(t)2η2 + 1
.
(A.6)
Because these deterministic coefficient functions (A.6) are integrable (indeed, they are
square integrable by (2.7)), the linear SDE (A.5) has a unique non-exploding strong so-
lution vt for t ∈ [0, 1] which is a Gaussian Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
For n ∈ N, we define the stopping times
τwn := inf{t > 0 :
∫ t
0
H(t, ws, a˜Σ)
2ds ≥ n} ∧ 1, (A.7)
τvn := inf{t > 0 :
∫ t
0
H(s, vs, a˜Σ)
2ds ≥ n} ∧ 1, (A.8)
where ws appearing in (A.7) is defined in (1.3) and vs appearing in in (A.8) is defined in
(A.5). Because (A.5) has a unique strong and non-exploding solution for t ∈ [0, 1], we have
lim
n→∞P(τ
v
n = 1) = 1. (A.9)
By Novikov’s condition, the processes (Nt∧τwn )t∈[0,1] are martingales for each n ∈ N, and
so we can define on Fτwn the P-equivalent probability measure Q(n) by the Radon-Nikodym
derivative
dQ(n)
dP
:= Nτwn . (A.10)
For each n ∈ N, Girsanov’s theorem produces the Q(n) Brownian motion
dB
(n)
t := dBt +
H(t, wt, a˜Σ)
σw(t)2η2 + 1
σw(t)ηdt, t ∈ [0, τwn ]. (A.11)
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Therefore, the Q(n) dynamics of dwt defined in (1.3) become
dwt = (α− piwt)dt+ ηdB(n)t −
H(t, wt, a˜Σ)
σw(t)2η2 + 1
σw(t)η
2dt, t ∈ [0, τwn ]. (A.12)
By comparing (A.5) with (A.12) and using strong uniqueness of (A.5) we see that the
distribution of (vt∧τvn)t∈[0,1] under P is identical to the distribution of (wt∧τwn )t∈[0,1] under
Q(n). Consequently, by using the definitions (A.7) and (A.8), we have
Q(n)(τwn ≤ x) = P(τvn ≤ x), x > 0. (A.13)
Then we have
E[N1] = lim
n→∞E[N11τwn =1]
= lim
n→∞E[Nτwn 1τwn =1]
= lim
n→∞Q
(n)(τwn = 1)
= lim
n→∞P(τ
v
n = 1) = 1.
(A.14)
The first equality in (A.14) follows from the (A.9) and the Dominated Convergence Theorem
which is applicable because N11τwn =1 ≤ N1 and E[N1] ≤ 1. The third equality uses (A.10),
the fourth equality uses (A.13), and the fifth and final equality uses (A.9). Consequently,
Nt defined in (A.1) is a positive supermartingale with constant expectation and is therefore
also a martingale.
♦
Proof of Theorem 2.2: We conjecture (and verify) the following equilibrium price-drift
functions in (2.3) defined in terms of a continuous function µ1(t) satisfying (2.6):
µ0(t) :=
4κ(t)γ(t)
(
µ1(t)− κ(t)
)
M
(
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
) , (A.15)
µ2(t) := −2κ(t)γ(t)µ1(t)
2κ(t)− µ1(t) , (A.16)
µ3(t) :=
2
(
κ(t)− µ1(t)
)
M
, (A.17)
µ4(t) :=
4
(
γ(t)− 1)κ(t)(κ(t)− µ1(t))
M
(
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
) , (A.18)
µ5(t) :=
2
(
γ(t)− 1)κ(t)µ1(t)
2κ(t)− µ1(t) . (A.19)
We split the proof into two steps.
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Step 1 (individual optimality): Given the price-impact function µ1(t) and the con-
jectured associated functions (A.15)-(A.19) for the price-drift relation (2.2), we derive the
individual investor’s value function V for the maximization problem (1.13) and the associ-
ated optimal control process θˆi,t. To this end, for ai, aΣ, Xi, w ∈ R, t ∈ [0, 1], and Li ≥ 0,
we define the quadratic function
V (t,Xi, w, Li, ai, aΣ)
:= Xi − Li −
(
β0(t) + β1(t)a
2
i + β2(t)aiaΣ + β3(t)a
2
Σ + β4(t)w
2
+ β5(t)wai + β6(t)aΣw + β7(t)w + β8(t)ai + β9(t)aΣ
)
,
(A.20)
where the deterministic coefficient functions (βj)
9
j=0 are given by the ODEs
β′0 = −αβ7 − β4η2 +
(γ − 1)2κ2(κ− µ1)(4w20 − 8Mw0θi,−)−M2(γ − 1)2θ2i,−κµ21
M2(µ1 − 2κ)2 ,
β′1 = −
γ2κµ21
(µ1 − 2κ)2 ,
β′2 =
8γ2κ2(µ1 − κ)
M(µ1 − 2κ)2 ,
β′3 =
4γ2κ2(κ− µ1)
M2(µ1 − 2κ)2 ,
β′4 =
κ− µ1
M2
+ 2β4pi, (A.21)
β′5 =
4γκ(κ− µ1)
M(2κ− µ1) + β5pi,
β′6 =
4γκ(µ1 − κ)
M2(2κ− µ1) + β6pi,
β′7 = −2αβ4 + β7pi +
4(γ − 1)(w0 −Mθi,−)κ(κ− µ1)
M2(2κ− µ1) ,
β′8 = −αβ5 +
2(γ − 1)γκ(4w0κ(κ− µ1) +Mθi,−µ21)
M(µ1 − 2κ)2 ,
β′9 = −αβ6 +
8(γ − 1)γκ2(Mθi,− − w0)(κ− µ1)
M2(µ1 − 2κ)2 ,
together with the terminal conditions βj(1) = 0 for j ∈ {0, ..., 9}. Even though some of the
β(t) functions depend on investor i’s initial holdings θi,−, this dependence does not affect
the following arguments and so is suppressed in the notation that follows. We start by
showing that V defined in (A.20) is investor i’s value function. The terminal conditions for
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the ODEs describing (βj)
9
j=0 produce the terminal condition
V (1, Xi, w, Li, ai, aΣ) = Xi − Li, ai, aΣ, Xi, w ∈ R, Li ≥ 0. (A.22)
For an arbitrary strategy θi ∈ Ai, Itoˆ’s lemma produces the dynamics
dV =
(
Vt +
1
2
Vwwη
2 +
1
2
VXXθ
2
i,t(σ
2
wη
2 + 1) + VXwθi,tσwη
2
+ Vw(α− piwt) + VXθi,tµi,t + VLκ(t)
(
γ(t)(a˜i − θi,−)− (θi,t − θi,−)
)2)
dt
+ VXθi,t(σwηdBt + dDt) + VwηdBt
≤ VXθi,t(σwηdBt + dDt) + VwηdBt. (A.23)
The inequality in (A.23) comes from the HJB-equation
0 = sup
θi,t∈R
(
Vt +
1
2
Vwwη
2 +
1
2
VXXθ
2
i,t(σ
2
wη
2 + 1) + VXwθi,tσwη
2
+ Vw(α− piwt) + VXθi,tµi,t + VLκ(t)
(
γ(t)(a˜i − θi,−)− (θi,t − θi,−)
)2)
,
(A.24)
which the function V defined in (A.20) satisfies given the ODEs for βj , j ∈ {0, ...9}, in
(A.21). In integral form, (A.23) reads
V (1, Xi,1, w1, Li,1, a˜i, a˜Σ)− V (0, Xi,0, w0, Li,0, a˜i, a˜Σ)
≤
∫ 1
0
(
VXθi,t(σwηdBt + dDt) + VwηdBt
)
.
(A.25)
To see that the Brownian integral (which is always a local martingale) on the right-hand-
side in (A.25) is indeed a martingale, we first compute the two partial derivatives in (A.25)
using the definition of V in (A.20):
VX = 1, Vw = −
(
2β4w + a˜iβ5 + a˜Σβ6 + β7
)
. (A.26)
Because the coefficient functions βj are bounded, the integrability condition (1.12) in the
definition of the admissible set Ai (see Definition 1.1) ensures the stochastic integral on the
right-hand-side in (A.25) is a martingale. Consequently, the terminal condition (A.22) and
the inequality in (A.25) produce
E[Xi,1 − Li,1] = E[V (1, Xi,1, w1, Li,1, a˜i, a˜Σ)] ≤ V (0, Xi,0, w0, Li,0, a˜i, a˜Σ). (A.27)
Because the right-hand side in (A.27) does not depend on θi,t ∈ Ai (from V ’s definition
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(A.20)), we have
sup
θi∈Ai
E[Xi,1 − Li,1] ≤ V (0, Xi,0, w0, Li,0, a˜i, a˜Σ). (A.28)
From (A.28) we see that V is an upper bound for the maximization problem (1.13). To get
equality in (A.28), we show that θˆi,t defined in (2.8) is optimal. To this end, we re-write
(2.8) as
θˆi,t = G0(t)a˜Σ +G1(t)wt +G2(t)a˜i +G3(t)θi,− +G4(t)w0, (A.29)
where, from (2.8), we have defined the deterministic functions
G0(t) := − 2κ(t)γ(t)
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
1
M
,
G1(t) :=
1
M
,
G2(t) :=
2κ(t)γ(t)
2κ(t)− µ1(t) ,
G3(t) :=
2κ(t)
(
1− γ(t))
2κ(t)− µ1(t) ,
G4(t) := −
2κ(t)
(
1− γ(t))
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
1
M
.
(A.30)
The coefficient in front of θ2i,t in (A.24) equals
µ1(t)− κ(t). (A.31)
Therefore, the second-order condition (2.6) comes from requiring negativity of (A.31). Be-
cause µ1(t) is assumed to satisfy (2.6), we see that θˆi,t defined in (2.8) belongs to the
admissible set Ai as defined in Definition (1.1). Furthermore, θˆi,t produces equality in
(A.24) and (A.25). Therefore, the upper bound (A.28) ensures that θˆi,t is optimal.
Step 2 (equilibrium): This step of the proof establishes the equilibrium properties in
Definition 2.1. We start by using (A.29) and (1.5) to rewrite the clearing condition (1.2) as
wt =
M∑
i=1
θˆi,t = MG0(t)a˜Σ +MG1(t)wt +G2(t)a˜Σ +G3(t)w0 +MG4(t)w0. (A.32)
This gives us the following three restrictions for the wt-coefficients, the a˜Σ-coefficients, and
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the constants:
1 = MG1(t), 0 = MG0(t) +G2(t), 0 = G3(t) +MG4(t) (A.33)
which the functions in (A.30) satisfy. Next, to ensure that the last restriction (iii) in
Definition 2.1 holds, we substitute (A.29) into (2.3) to get
µˆt := µ0(t)a˜Σ + µ1(t)θˆi,t + µ2(t)a˜i + µ3(t)wt + µ4(t)w0 + µ5θi,−
= µ0(t)a˜Σ + µ1(t)
(
G0(t)a˜Σ +G1(t)wt +G2(t)a˜i +G3(t)θi,− +G4(t)w0
)
+ µ2(t)a˜i + µ3(t)wt + µ4(t)w0 + µ5θi,−.
(A.34)
The requirement in (iii) that the a˜i and θi,− coefficients in µˆt are zero in equilibrium can
be stated as
0 = µ1(t)G2(t) + µ2(t), 0 = µ1(t)G3(t) + µ5(t). (A.35)
The formulas for µ0(t), µ2(t), ..., µ5(t) in (A.15)-(A.19) ensure that the two requirements in
(A.35) hold. In particular, inserting (A.30) into µˆt in (A.34) gives the equilibrium price-drift
in (2.17). Because the private information variables (a˜i, θi,−, θ
(0)
i,−) do not appear in (2.17),
the last requirement (iii) in Definition 2.1 holds.
Finally, we need to establish the terminal price condition (1.4). To this end, we
need the ODEs for (g0, g, σw) in (2.10). We define the (augmented) filtration by Ft :=
σ(a˜Σ, wu, Du)u∈[0,t] for t ∈ [0, 1]. Lemma A.1 above ensures that the minimal P-equivalent
probability measure Q can be defined on F1 by the Radon-Nikodym derivative
dQ
dP
:= e−
∫ 1
0 λudZu− 12
∫ 1
0 λ
2
udu, (A.36)
where (λ, Z) are defined by (A.2) and (A.3) given µˆt in (2.17).
27 Girsanov’s theorem
produces the Q-Brownian motions
dDQt := dDt +
µˆt
σw(t)2η2 + 1
dt, (A.37)
dBQt := dBt +
µˆt
σw(t)2η2 + 1
σw(t)ηdt. (A.38)
27Because our model has more sources of randomness than stocks, our model is necessarily incomplete.
Consequently, there are infinitely many P-equivalent probability measures under which the equilibrium stock
price process is a martingale. The minimal measure Q defined in (A.36) is sufficient for our purpose and its
prominent history is detailed in Fo¨llmer and Schweizer (2010).
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The Q-dynamics of (D,w) then become
dDt = dD
Q
t −
µˆt
σw(t)2η2 + 1
dt, (A.39)
dwt = (α− piwt)dt+ ηdBQt −
µˆt
σw(t)2η2 + 1
σw(t)η
2dt. (A.40)
These dynamics (A.39)-(A.40) ensure that the pair (D,w) remains a Markov process under
Q. We will now show the identity:
EQ[D1 + ϕ0a˜Σ + ϕ1w1|Ft] = g0(t) + g(t)a˜Σ + σw(t)wt +Dt, t ∈ [0, 1]. (A.41)
To see this, note that the terminal conditions for the ODEs in (2.10) ensure that (A.41)
holds at t = 1. Furthermore, the conditional expectation on the left-hand-side of (A.41) is
a martingale under the minimal martingale measure Q. Therefore, to see that (A.41) also
holds for t ∈ [0, 1), it suffices to show that the right-hand-side of (A.41) is a martingale
under Q. To this end, we apply Ito’s lemma to the right-hand-side of (A.41) to produce
the P-dynamics
d
(
g0(t) + g(t)a˜Σ + σw(t)wt +Dt
)
=
(
g′0(t) + g
′(t)a˜Σ + σ′w(t)wt
)
dt+ dDt + σw(t)dwt.
(A.42)
The risk-neutral drift (i.e., the drift under the minimal martingale measure Q) is
g′0(t) + g
′(t)a˜Σ + σ′w(t)wt −
µˆt
σw(t)2η2 + 1
+
(
(α− piwt)− µˆt
σw(t)2η2 + 1
σw(t)η
2
)
σw(t)
= g′0(t) + g
′(t)a˜Σ + σ′w(t)wt + (α− piwt)σw(t)− µˆt
= g′0(t) + g
′(t)a˜Σ + σ′w(t)wt + (α− piwt)σw(t)
−
(
µ0(t)a˜Σ + µ1(t)θˆi,t + µ2(t)a˜i + µ3(t)wt + µ4(t)w0 + µ5θi,−
)
= 0,
(A.43)
where the last equality follows from inserting θˆi,t from (2.8) and using the ODEs in (2.10).
This shows that the right-hand-side of (A.41) is given by
g0(0) + g(0)a˜Σ + σw(0)w0 +D
Q
t + η
∫ t
0
σw(u)dB
Q
u , t ∈ [0, 1]. (A.44)
Because the function σw(t) is bounded, the process (A.44) is a Q-martingale.
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♦
Remark A.1. We make the following notes about the above proof:
1. The proof is that of a “backward engineer’s” in that it guesses a solution and then veri-
fies that the equilibrium conditions are met. Instead of conjecturing (A.15)-(A.19), we
could alternatively let µj(t), j ∈ {0, 2, 3, 4, 5}, be arbitrary continuous functions and
adjust (A.30) appropriately. Then (A.33) and (A.35) would produce five restrictions
which would in turn produce (A.15)-(A.19).
2. Because the investors’ utilities are risk-neutral, Step 1 can be greatly simplified by
noticing that for θi ∈ Ai we have the representation
E[Xi,1 − Li,1|Fi,0]
= Xi,0 + E
[∫ 1
0
(
θi,sµi,s − κ(s)
(
γ(s)(a˜i − θi,−)− (θi,s − θi,−)
)2)
ds
∣∣∣Fi,0] .
By inserting µi,s from (2.3), the integrand in the ds-integral becomes quadratic in θi,s.
Consequently, we can optimize pointwise over θi,s to produce (2.8). The reason we
give a proof using the HJB-equation is because we can re-use it in the exponential
utility case considered in Appendix C.
Proof of Theorem 5.1: (i): We will write “...” for terms that do not depend on µ1. We first
need (recalling that the money market account is in zero net supply)
M∑
i=1
Xi,0 = S0
M∑
i=1
θi,0
=
(
g0(0) + g(0)a˜Σ + σw(0)w0 +D0
)
w0
= ...+ αw0
∫ 1
0
u
µ1 − 2κ
M
du+ w20
∫ 1
0
µ1 − 2κ
M
du,
(A.45)
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where the second equality follows from
∑M
i=1 θi,0 = w0. Then we have
M∑
i=1
CEi =
M∑
i=1
Xi,0 −
(
Mβ0(0) + β1(0)
M∑
i=1
a˜2i +
(
β2(0) +Mβ3(0)
)
a˜2Σ
+Mβ4(0)w
2
0 +
(
β5(0) +Mβ6(0)
)
w0a˜Σ +Mβ7(0)w0 + (β8(0) +Mβ9(0))a˜Σ
)
= ...+
∫ 1
0
{
− u(η2 + α2u+ αw0)µ1
M
− γ
2κµ21
(µ1 − 2κ)2
M∑
i=1
a˜2i −
4γ2κ2(κ− µ1)
M(µ1 − 2κ)2 a˜
2
Σ
}
du.
(A.46)
We define the constants
c1 := E[a˜2Σ]−M
M∑
i=1
E[a˜2i ], c2 := t(η2 + α2t+ αw0), (A.47)
in which case the two conditions in (5.8) become
4γ(t)2c1 < c2 < 0, t ∈ (0, 1]. (A.48)
Based on the above, we seek to maximize
−c2µ1
M
− γ
2κµ21
(2κ− µ1)2
M∑
i=1
E[a˜2i ]−
4γ2κ2(κ− µ1)
M(2κ− µ1)2 E[a˜
2
Σ]. (A.49)
By changing variables to y := 2κγ2k−µ1 so that µ1 =
2(y−γ)κ
y , the maximization problem
becomes
max
y∈(0,2γ)
G(y), where G(y) :=
(c1y
2 − 2c2)(y − 2γ)− 2c2γ
My
κ− γ2κ
M∑
i=1
E[a˜2i ]. (A.50)
The inequalities in (A.48) produce
G′′(y) =
2κ
My3
(
c1y
3 + 2c2γ) < 0, y ∈ (0, 2γ). (A.51)
Therefore, the first-order condition is sufficient. We observe that
G′(y) =
2κ
My2
(
c1y
3 − γ(c1y2 + c2)
)
. (A.52)
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Then, (A.48) produces
G′(γ) = −2κc2
Mγ
> 0, (A.53)
G′(2γ) =
κ
2Mγ
(4γ2c1 − c2) < 0. (A.54)
By the intermediate value theorem and the strict concavity of G, we conclude that the
unique solution of G′(y) = 0 satisfies γ < yˆ < 2γ. This yˆ corresponds to 0 < µ∗1 < κ.
Finally, (A.52) says that yˆ = 2κγ2k−µˆ1 is the solution of c1y
3 − γ(c1y2 + c2) = 0 and here κ
does not appear.
(ii) and (iii): Because E[w2t ] = w20 + (2w0α+ η2)t+ α2t2, the differences (5.6) and (5.7)
produce the following objective which is equivalent to (5.1):
f(µ1(t), t)− f(0, t)−
(
h(µ1(t), t)− h(0, t)
)
= −µ1(t)
( t2α2
M
+
t(w0α+ η
2)
M
)
− µ1(t)
2γ(t)2κ(t)(
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
)2( M∑
i=1
E[a˜2i ]−
E[a˜2Σ]
M
)
.
(A.55)
The claims in (ii) and (iii) follow from (A.55). ♦
B VWAP equilibrium
This section relies heavily on the analysis in Frei and Westray (2015). The ca`dla`g process
γ = (γt)t∈[0,1] is a gamma bridge process with γ0 = 0 and γ1 = 1 with probability one.
The underlying gamma process is normalized to have both unit mean and unit variance.
Corollary 1 in E´mery and Yor (2004) ensures that γt has predictable intensity (1−γt−)ψ0(t)
and that the quadratic variation process [γ]t has predictable intensity (1 − γt−)2ψ1(t). In
other words, the processes
γt −
∫ t
0
(1− γs−)ψ0(s)ds, and [γ]t −
∫ t
0
(1− γs−)2ψ1(s)ds, t ∈ [0, 1], (B.1)
are martingales where the deterministic functions ψ0(t) and ψ1(t) are defined as
ψ0(t) :=
∫
[0,1]
(1− z)−tdz, ψ1(t) :=
∫
[0,1]
z(1− z)−tdz, t ∈ [0, 1]. (B.2)
The dynamics of the predictable cross quadratic variation process (also called the
quadratic cross characteristics) between the stock supply wt + ρa˜Σγt on the left-hand-side
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of (7.5) and the target ratio γt is given by
d〈γ,w + ρa˜Σγ〉t = ρa˜Σd〈γ〉t = ρa˜Σ(1− γt−)2ψ1(t)dt. (B.3)
This implies that ρ controls their dependency structure. In particular, ρ := 0 produces
independence between the stock supply and the target ratio.
As in Frei and Westray (2015), we claim (and prove below) that the value function
corresponding to the optimization problem (7.4) for price dynamics defined by (7.6) is
V (t,Xi, w, Li, γ) := Xi − Li − J(t, w, γ), Xi, w ∈ R, Li ≥ 0, γ ∈ [0, 1]. (B.4)
In (B.4), the function J(t, w, γ) is defined by
J(t, w, γ) :=
(
β0(t) + β1(t)γ
2 + β2(t)γw + β3(t)w
2 + β4(t)w + β5(t)γ
)
, (B.5)
where the deterministic coefficient functions are given by the following linear ODEs
β′0 = −αβ4 − β3η2 − β5ψ0 − β1ψ1, β0(1) = 0,
β′1 =
4a˜2Σκ
2(κ− µ1) + 8a˜ia˜ΣMκ2(µ1 − κ) +M2(β1(µ1 − 2κ)2(2ψ0 − ψ1)− a˜2iκµ21)
M2(µ1 − 2κ)2
+
a˜Σ(κ− µ1)ρ(4a˜iMκ+ 2a˜Σκ(ρ− 2)− a˜Σµ1ρ)
M2(2κ− µ1) , β1(1) = 0, (B.6)
β′2 =
4a˜Σκ(µ1 − κ) +M(4a˜iκ(κ− µ1) +Mβ2(2κ− µ1)(pi + ψ0)
M2(2κ− µ1) +
2a˜Σ(κ− µ1)ρ
M2
,
β2(1) = 0,
β′3 =
κ− µ1
M2
+ 2β3pi, β3(1) = 0,
β′4 = β4pi − 2αβ3 − β2ψ0, β4(1) = 0,
β′5 = β5ψ0 + 2β1(ψ1 − ψ0)− αβ2, β5(1) = 0.
The investor index i is suppressed in the following.
We need to adjust the notion of admissibility given in Definition 1.1 to the current case
of noise generated by the Brownian motions (B,D) and the gamma bridge process γt. We
recall that Fi,t is defined in (7.3).
Definition B.1. An Fi,t predictable process θi = (θi,t)t∈[0,1] is deemed admissible, and we
write θi,t ∈ Ai, if
E
[∫ 1
0
θ2i,t
(
1 + (1− γt−)ψ0(t)
)
dt
∣∣∣Fi,0] <∞. (B.7)
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♦
When µ1(t) satisfies the second-order condition (2.6), we can define the deterministic
pricing coefficients in (7.6) to be:
µ2(t) :=
2
(
κ(t)− µ1(t)
)(
2κ(t)(ρ− 1)− µ1(t)ρ
)
M
(
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
) ,
µ3(t) :=
2
(
κ(t)− µ1(t)
)
M
,
µ4(t) := − 2κ(t)µ1(t)
2κ(t)− µ1(t) .
(B.8)
The following result is the analogue of Theorem 2.2 for the gamma bridge process.
Theorem B.2. Let the parameter restrictions (7.1) hold and let κ : [0, 1] → (0,∞), and
µ1 : [0, 1]→ R be continuous functions which satisfy the second-order condition (2.6). Then
the functions µ2, µ3, and µ4 defined in (B.8) form an equilibrium in which:
(i) Investor optimal holdings in equilibrium are given by
θˆi,t :=
wt
M
+ γt−
[ 2κ(t)
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
(
a˜i − a˜Σ
M
)
+ ρ
a˜Σ
M
]
. (B.9)
(ii) The equilibrium stock price is given by
St = g0(t) + σw(t)wt +Dt + σγ(t)a˜Σγt, (B.10)
where the deterministic functions g0, σw and σγ are the unique solutions of the follow-
ing linear ODEs:
g′0(t) = −a˜Σσγ(t)ψ0(t)− ασw(t), g0(1) = ϕ0a˜Σ,
σ′w(t) =
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
M
+ piσw(t), σw(1) = ϕ1,
σ′γ(t) = σγ(t)ψ0(t) +
2κ(t)(ρ− 1)− µ1(t)ρ
M
, σγ(1) = 0.
(B.11)
Remark B.1. Before we give the proof, let us comment on the linear ODEs in (B.11).
Because ψ0(t) =
1
1−t explodes as t ↑ 1, the zero terminal condition for σγ produces the
unique solution (7.7). Because both κ(t) and µ1(t) are continuous for t ∈ [0, 1], L’Hopital’s
rule ensures that σγ(t)→ 0 as t ↑ 1. From (7.7), it follows that ψ0(t)σγ(t) is integrable over
t ∈ [0, 1] which ensures that g0(t) in (B.11) can be found by integration.
Proof. The proof of Theorem B.2 is similar to the proof of Theorem 2.2 and here we only
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outline the needed changes. For an arbitrary strategy θi,t ∈ Ai, Itoˆ’s lemma produces the
drift of V = V (t,Xi,t, wt, Li,t, γt) defined in (B.4) to be
Vt +
∫
[0,1]
(
J(t, wt, γt− + (1− γt−)z)− J(t, wt, γt−)
)
(1− z)−tz−1dz
+ Vw(α− piwt) + θi,tµi,t − κ(t)
(
a˜iγt− − θi,t
)2
+
1
2
Vwwη
2.
(B.12)
By using (B.5) and (B.2) we can write the dz-integral in the drift (B.12) as∫
[0,1]
(
J(t, wt, γt− + (1− γt−)z)− J(t, wt, γt−)
)
(1− z)−tz−1dz
= −β2ψ0wt +
(
(β5 − 2β1)ψ0 + 2β1ψ1
)
γt−
+ β1
(
2ψ0 − ψ1)γ2t− + β2ψ0wtγt− − ψ0β5 − ψ1β1.
(B.13)
Therefore, subject to µ1(t) satisfying the second-order condition (2.6), we see that θˆi,t
defined in (B.9) maximizes the drift (B.12). To verify that θˆi,t defined in (B.9) is admissible
in the sense of Definition B.1, we use γt ∈ [0, 1] and (2.6) to get the bound
|θˆi,t| ≤ |wt|
M
+ 2
∣∣∣a˜i − a˜Σ
M
∣∣∣+ |ρa˜Σ|
M
. (B.14)
Based on this, the independence between wt and γt as well as E[γt] = t give us for t ∈ [0, 1)
E
[
θˆ2i,t
(
1 + (1− γt−)ψ0(t)
)∣∣Fi,0] ≤ 2E [( |wt|
M
+ 2
∣∣∣a˜i − a˜Σ
M
∣∣∣+ |ρa˜Σ|
M
)2∣∣∣Fi,0] . (B.15)
Here we also used that ψ0(t) in (B.2) can be written as ψ0(t) =
1
1−t for t ∈ [0, 1). The
right-hand-side of (B.15) is uniformly bounded in t ∈ [0, 1] and the integrability property
(B.7) follows by integration in time.
Finally, we adjust the second part of the proof of Theorem 2.2 by changing the right-
hand-side of (A.41) to
EQ[D1 + ϕ0a˜Σ + ϕ1w1|σ(a˜Σ, wu, γu, Du)u∈[0,t]]
= g0(t) + σw(t)wt +Dt + σγ(t)a˜Σγt.
(B.16)
In (B.16), the probability measure Q is still defined by the Radon-Nikodym derivative
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(A.36). Itoˆ’s product rule produces the dynamics
dσγ(t)γt
= σ′γ(t)γt−dt+ σγ(t)dγt
=
(
σ′γ(t)γt− + σγ(t)(1− γt−)ψ0(t)
)
dt+ σγ(t)
(
dγt − (1− γt−)ψ0(t)dt
)
.
(B.17)
Based on this, we re-use (A.43) to see that the drift of the right-hand-side of (B.16) is
g′0(t) + σ
′
w(t)wt + (α− piwt)σw(t)
− µˆt + a˜Σσ′γ(t)γt− + a˜Σσγ(t)(1− γt−)ψ0(t),
(B.18)
where the analogue of µˆt defined in (2.17) is given by
µˆt : =
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
M
wt +
2κ(t)(ρ− 1)− µ1(t)ρ
M
γt−a˜Σ. (B.19)
Consequently, by inserting (B.19) for µˆt into (B.18), the ODEs in (B.11) follow from match-
ing wt, a˜Σγt−, and the remaining terms.
♦
C Equilibrium with exponential utilities
This appendix extends our equilibrium analysis to strategic investors with exponential util-
ities Ui(x) := −e−x/τ with a common risk-tolerance parameter τ > 0. In other words, we
replace the risk-neutral objective (1.13) with
inf
θi∈Ai
E
[
e−
1
τ
(Xi,1−Li,1)
∣∣∣Fi,0] . (C.1)
Here the processes (Li,t, Xi,t) are still defined by (1.1) and (1.10); however, the admissible set
Ai needs to be altered (see Definition C.1 below). Unlike risk-neutral utilities, exponential
utilities produce coupled non-linear ODEs (see (C.4) and (C.5) below), which potentially
explode in finite time. While it is possible to work out the exponential utility model without
the parameter restrictions
α := 0, pi := 0, η := 1, θi,− :=
w0
M
, (C.2)
these restrictions greatly simplify the following presentation.
We will consider continuous functions µ1 : [0, 1) → R which satisfy the following two
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conditions. First, in the exponential case, the second-order condition (2.6) becomes
µ1(t) <
1 + σw(t)
2
2τ
+ κ(t), t ∈ [0, 1). (C.3)
Second, the following coupled Riccati ODEs
β′4 =
1 + σ2w + 2κτ − 2τ(µ1 + 2M2β24τ)
2M2τ2
, β4(1) = 0, (C.4)
σ′w =
1 + σ2w + 2κτ − µ1τ − 2Mβ4σwτ
Mτ
, σw(1) = ϕ1, (C.5)
must have non-exploding solutions for t ∈ [0, 1]. Whenever the ODEs (C.4) and (C.5) have
well-defined non-exploding solutions, we can define the function
V (t,Xi,w, Li, ai, aΣ) :=
e−
1
τ
(Xi−Li)+β0(t)+β1(t)a2i+β2(t)aiaΣ+β3(t)a2Σ+β4(t)w2+β5(t)wai+β6(t)aΣw+β8(t)ai .
(C.6)
We will show that V is the value function for the optimization problem (C.1) where, given
(C.4) and (C.5), the deterministic coefficient functions β0, ...β3, β5, β6, and β8 are given by
the following linear ODEs
β′0 = −β4 −
w20(γ − 1)2κ
M2τ
, β0(1) = 0,
β′1 =
1
2τ(1 + 2τκ− τµ1 + σ2w)2
(
4τβ5γκσw(1 + 2τκ− 2τµ1 + σ2w)
− τβ25
(
(1 + 2τκ− τµ1)2 + (1 + 2τκ)σ2w
)
− 2γ2κ(2τκ(1 + σ2w) + (1− τµ1 + σ2w)2)), β1(1) = 0,
β′2 = −β5β6 −
(2γκ+ β5σw)
2(1 + 2τκ− 2τµ1 + σ2w)
M(1 + 2τκ− τµ1 + σ2w)2
, β2(1) = 0,
β′3 = −
β26
2
+
(2γκ+ β5σw)
2(1 + 2τκ− 2τµ1 + σ2w)
2M2(1 + 2τκ− τµ1 + σ2w)2
, β3(1) = 0, (C.7)
β′5 = −2β4β5 +
(2γκ+ β5σw)(1 + 2τκ− 2τµ1 + σ2w)
τM(1 + 2τκ− τµ1 + σ2w)
, β5(1) = 0,
β′6 = −2β4β6 −
(2γκ+ β5σw)(1 + 2τκ− 2τµ1 + σ2w)
τM2(1 + 2τκ− τµ1 + σ2w)
, β6(1) = 0,
β′8 =
2w0(γ − 1)γκ
τM
, β8(1) = 0.
Finally, we can adjust the notion of admissibility given in Definition 1.1 to the case of
exponential utilities.
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Definition C.1. A jointly measurable and Fi,t adapted process (θi,t)t∈[0,1] is deemed to be
admissible, and we write θi,t ∈ Ai, if the local martingale∫ t
0
(
VXθi,u
(
σw(u)dBu + dDu
)
+ VwdBu
)
, t ∈ [0, 1], (C.8)
is well-defined and is a martingale. In (C.8), the terms VX and Vw denote the partial
derivatives of the function V defined in (C.6).
♦
The deterministic pricing coefficients (A.15)-(A.19) are replaced with
µ0(t) := −(2γ(t)κ(t) + σw(t)β5(t))(1 + 2τ(κ(t)− µ1(t)) + σw(t)
2
M
(
1 + σw(t)2 + 2κ(t)τ − µ1(t)τ
) − σwβ6,
µ2(t) := −µ1(t)(2κ(t)γ(t) + β5(t)σw(t))τ
1 + σw(t)2 + 2κ(t)τ − µ1(t)τ ,
µ3(t) :=
1 + σw(t)
2 + 2(κ(t)− µ1(t)−Mβ4(t)σw(t))τ
Mτ
, (C.9)
µ4(t) :=
2κ(t)(γ(t)− 1)
M
,
µ5(t) := 0.
The analogue of Theorem 2.2 for the case of exponential utilities is:
Theorem C.2. Let the parameter restrictions (C.2) hold and let γ : [0, 1] → [0,∞) be a
continuous function. Let κ : [0, 1) → (0,∞) and µ1 : [0, 1) → R be continuous and square
integrable functions (i.e., (2.7) holds), satisfy the second-order condition (C.3), and ensure
that the coupled Riccati ODEs (C.4) and (C.5) have well-defined non-explosive solutions on
[0, 1]. Then the functions µ0, µ2, µ3, µ4, and µ5 defined in (C.9) together with σw defined in
(C.5) form an equilibrium in which:
(i) Investor optimal holdings in equilibrium are given by
θˆi,t =
wt
M
+
(
2κ(t)γ(t) + β5(t)σw(t)
)
τ(
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
)
τ + 1 + σw(t)2
(
a˜i − a˜Σ
M
)
. (C.10)
(ii) The equilibrium stock price is given by (2.9) where the deterministic functions g0 and
g are the unique solutions of the following linear ODEs:
g′(t) = −2γ(t)κ(t) +
(
β5(t) +Mβ6(t)
)
σw(t)
M
, g(1) = ϕ0,
g′0(t) =
2w0(γ(t)− 1)κ(t)
M
, g0(1) = 0.
(C.11)
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Proof. The proof of Theorem C.2 is similar to the proof of Theorem 2.2 and here we only
outline the two needed changes. First, to verify that (C.10) is admissible in the sense of
Definition C.1, we re-write the local martingale dynamics (A.23) appearing in (C.8) as
dV (t,Xi,t,wt, Li,t, a˜i, a˜Σ) = V (t,Xi,t, wt, Li,t, a˜i, a˜Σ)
(
Ji,tdBt − 1τ θˆi,tdDt
)
. (C.12)
In (C.12), the process θˆi,t is defined in (C.10) and
Ji,t :=
(
2β4(t)wt + a˜iβ5(t) + a˜Σβ6(t)
)− 1τ θˆi,tσw(t). (C.13)
Because the deterministic functions appearing in front of wt, a˜i, and a˜Σ in (C.10) and
(C.13) are uniformly bounded, and because wt defined in (1.3) is Gaussian, the Dole´ans-
Dade representation (C.12) combined with Corollary 3.5.16 in Karatzas and Shreve (1991)
produces the wanted martingality of V .
Second, we need to verify that the local martingale N = (Nt)t∈[0,1] in (A.1) is a martin-
gale when µˆt in (2.17) is replaced by
µˆt :=
1 + σw(t)
2 +
(
2κ(t)− µ1(t)
)
τ − 2Mβ4(t)σw(t)τ
Mτ
wt
+
2
(
γ(t)− 1)κ(t)
M
w0 −
2γ(t)κ(t) +
(
β5(t) +Mβ6(t)
)
σw(t)
M
a˜Σ.
(C.14)
To this end, we note that wt remains a non-exploding Gaussian Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
under the P-equivalent probability measures (Q(n))n∈N defined in (A.10). Consequently, the
proof of Lemma A.1 carries over to this exponential utility case where µˆt is defined in (C.14).
♦
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D Internet Appendix
This appendix extends the numerical analysis of Section 6 to consider the impact of TWAP
benchmarking on the liquidity-premium St−Dt. From (2.9), the expected liquidity premium
is
E[St −Dt|σ(a˜Σ)] = g0(t) + g(t)a˜Σ + σw(t)E[wt], (D.1)
which consists of three components. Consider g0(t) first. From (2.11), g0(t) depends linearly
on α and w0. The first term in (2.11) implies that the liquidity premium increases when
α < 0 (the future noise-trader supply is shrinking in expectation) when σw(t) < 0. The
second term in (2.11) implies that, as long as the target ratio γ(u) is less than one during
the day, the slope coefficient on w0 is positive. Therefore, equilibrium prices and, thus, the
expected liquidity premia, are increasing in the initial aggregate position w0 held by the
strategic investors. This is illustrated numerically in Plot A in Figure 5. Note that, since
the slope coefficient on w0 in (2.11) does not depend on µ1(t), the slope is the same in all
three equilibria.
Next, consider the g(t)a˜Σ component of the expected liquidity premium in (D.1). The
ODE for g(t) in (2.10) and a boundary condition g(1) ≥ 0 imply that g(t) is positive and
decreasing given ϕ0 ≥ 0. Thus, the expected liquidity premium is increasing in the latent
aggregate target imbalance a˜Σ for the strategic agents. This is intuitive since higher prices
depress expected stock returns and, thus, suppress strategic-investor demand as required
for market clearing. This is illustrated numerically in Plot B in Figure 5. Once again, the
plots are identical for all three equilibria, since g(t) from (2.10) is independent of µ1(t).
Lastly, the contribution from the third component of the expected liquidity premium
(D.1) follows from the price-impact loading σw(t) (as illustrated in Figure 2) and the ex-
pected path of noise-trader order imbalances. For example, the expected liquidity premium
at time t is depressed by decreasing (given α < 0) expected supply of shares E[wt] from
noise traders.
As is intuitive, the expected premium is larger when the penalty severity κ(t) is greater
since the strategic investors require more compensation (i.e., larger price discounts for buy-
ing and price premiums when selling) for deviating from their target trajectory. However,
as the end of the day approaches, the terminal price constraint (1.6) forces the expected
liquidity premium to converge to 0 given ϕ0 = ϕ1 = 0. In particular, this is true even for
the exploding severity function κ3(t).
Figure 6 shows the volatility of the intraday liquidity premium induced by the random
noise-trader imbalances. Initially, as expected, larger penalty severities κ(t) mean prices
need to move more to compensate investors for deviating from their target trajectories,
58
Figure 5: Expected liquidity premium slope coefficient on w0 in (2.11) (Plot A) and the
function g(t) from (2.10) (Plot B). The parameters are given by (6.2)-(6.5), and the dis-
cretization divides the day into 1000 trading rounds.
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κ3 (− · − · −) κ4 (− · ·−). κ3 (− · − · −) κ4 (− · ·−).
which magnifies the effect of randomness in the noise-trader imbalance wt. The liquidity-
premium variance initially increases due to the growing variance of wt, but eventually the
terminal price condition (1.6) forces the liquidity-premium volatility to converge to zero
given ϕ0 = ϕ1 = 0.
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Figure 6: Standard deviation SD[St−Dt|σ(a˜Σ)] of the liquidity premium with the welfare-
maximizer µ1(t) := µ
∗
1(t) (Plot A), the competitive equilibrium with µ1(t) := 0 (Plot
B), and the Vayanos µ1(t) in (3.14) (Plot C). The parameters are given by (6.2)-(6.5),
a˜Σ =
∑M
i=1 θi,− = w0 = 10, and the discretization divides the day into 1000 trading rounds.
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